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Abstract 
SMEs play a crucial role for European economies. The numbers show the high importance of 
SMEs for national economies. Accordingly, it is no surprise that the regulatory framework 
SMEs are imbedded in is the subject of an important political discussion. In the discussion it 
is frequently mentioned by representatives of SMEs as well as associations of SMEs, that the 
access to finance for SMEs is still inferior. Based on the importance of SMEs for national 
economies and the discussion on the accessibility of financial resources for SMEs, it is the 
main objective of this study to provide solid data on the access of SMEs to financial re-
sources. To provide the data, the study is focusing on four main issues. First of all, the impor-
tance of SMEs for national economies will be shown. After that the financing of SMEs in 
selected countries will be analysed. Then the availability of venture capital for SMEs will be 
discussed. Finally the tax regimes and the influence of the tax system on the access to finance 
for SMEs will be analysed. Since there is still a large variety among the tax systems of the 
European Union member states, the study has focused on Austria, France, Germany, Poland 
and the United Kingdom. 
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1  Executive Summary 
This study was conducted for the European Parliament in 2005
1. 
(1)  SMEs  play  a  crucial  role  for  European  economies.  In  all  European  Union  member 
states, the largest number of existing enterprises belongs to the category of small and me-
dium-sized enterprises. More than two thirds of all employed citizens of European Union 
member states are employed by SMEs. Up to 50% of the total GNP in most European Union 
member states are generated by SMEs. Last but not least, young technology based SMEs also 
are an important factor for economic growth. They have the potential to become big players in 
the future. 
The numbers show the great importance of SMEs for national economies. Accordingly, it is 
no surprise that the regulatory framework SMEs are imbedded in is the subject of an impor-
tant political discussion. In the discussion it is frequently mentioned by representatives of 
SMEs as well as associations of SMEs, that the access to finance for SMEs is still inferior. It 
is the perception of most entrepreneurs as well as of many economists, that there is a need to 
enhance the availability and access of SMEs to financial resources accordingly. Furthermore, 
with the introduction of the Basel II Accord the rumour of a credit crunch entered the field. 
The main hypothesis was that SMEs, due to the regulations of the Basel II Accord now have 
even less chances to gain access to financial resources. 
(2) Based on the importance of SMEs for national economies and the discussion on the acces-
sibility of financial resources for SMEs, it is the main objective of this study to provide 
solid data on the access of SMEs to financial resources. To provide the data, the study is fo-
cusing on four main issues. First of all, the importance of SMEs for national economies will 
be shown. After that, the financing of SMEs in selected countries will be analysed. Then the 
availability of venture capital for SMEs will be discussed. Finally the tax regimes and the 
influence of the tax system on the access to finance for SMEs will be analysed. Since there is 
still a large discrepancy among the tax systems of the European Union member states, the 
study has focused on Austria, France, Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom. The com-
position of these selected countries provides a certain assurance that the differences among 
European Union member states will be covered by the study. 
(3) Analysing the importance of SMEs for the selected economies, it has been shown that 
they are the backbone of the economies in those countries. Based on the definition of SMEs 
by the European Commission, the number of companies as well as the provided employment 
and the contribution to GDP in all selected countries verifies the hypothesis of a major impor-
tance of SMEs. Improving their situation and in particular the access to finance, thus is, from 
an economic point of view, a step in the right direction. 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank Parliamentarian Mr. Riebig for his support. The responsibility for the study lies 
completely with the authors. Access to Finance and Venture  
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(4) The analysis of the financial structure of SMEs illustrates a large variety in the main 
indicator - the debt to equity ratio. There are countries like Austria and Germany that show 
only small debt to equity ratios. The equity share in these countries is below 20%. Other 
countries, like for instance France and the United Kingdom, are much more equity driven. 
Two reasons are usually seen as factors for the low debt to equity ratio in these countries: On 
the one hand, there is a disadvantage of equity financing by the tax systems. On the other 
hand, in some cultural contexts the influence given to an equity investor on the management 
of a company is seen as negative. Both reasons are of great importance. In the study particu-
larly the tax system point had been analysed in depth.  
(5) On the debt financing side, in most countries bank loans are the most common instru-
ment. Financing resources like factoring, leasing etc. are partly used. In particular, in the con-
tinental European states of Austria and Germany bank loans are most important, whilst in the 
United Kingdom for instance, overdrafts play an equivalent role.  
(6) The analysis of the situation on the venture capital market shows, that even in recent 
years the decline of venture capital has not been detained. It is a general result, that from the 
year 2001 onwards the availability of venture capital for SMEs is declining. Venture capital-
ists concentrate in all selected countries on investments in the expansion phase or any later 
phase. The availability of venture capital for seed or early-stage phases is still very limited. 
The hope of the late 90’s to substitute substantial parts of debt financing by private equity and 
venture capital for early-stage investments has not been realised as the data shows. 
The weakness of equity financing in continental European SMEs is a result of four effects, 
which are (A) the financing of retirements, (B) cultural aspects, (C) the national accounting 
standards to the equity share, and (D) the opportunity cost of capital.  
For effect (A), the financing of retirements, economic circumstances will lead to a solution 
without political corrective: As the continental European retirement system, which is based on 
the pay as you go pension system, will not be able to finance retirement cost in reduced popu-
lations of the future, a more capital market oriented system will develop. Pension funds as 
seen in the UK will get more relevance in the continental EU countries, leading more capital 
to the investment market. A policy should provide a sufficient legal framework for this devel-
opment. 
Effect (B), the cultural aspect, may be influenced by a EU and/or national promotion: Sug-
gesting to SMEs that allowing external equity investments in their business can lead to a 
change of perspective in family-owned companies. This effect will be enhanced by a genera-
tional shift in post-war companies to the younger, more open-minded “Erbengeneration”. 
Effect (C), the differing national accounting standards, has started to decrease with the in-
troduction of IAS/IFRS for capital market oriented corporations from 1 January 2005. The 
process should be accelerated by enforcing international standards for smaller and non-capital Access to Finance and Venture  
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market oriented companies, too. The moment this development reaches SMEs, negative as-
pects will decrease. 
(7) The variety in tax systems between the UK and continental Europe leads to differences in 
debt-financing cost (effect (D)). The tax scheme in the UK promotes debt-financing compared 
to equity less than the continental European tax schemes do. 
The analysis of the tax system influence on the access to finance has to be done very care-
fully. Three different aspects have to be distinguished.  
1.  the influence of the tax system on equity financing,  
2.  the influence of the tax system on debt financing and  
3.  the influence of the tax system on venture capitalists.  
Furthermore, different types of SMEs have to be distinguished. In the study we differentiated 
between corporations and partnerships/sole proprietorships. 
(8) The main issue on equity financing is linked to the discussion on the treatment of equity 
endowments by the tax system. Here it is clear, that there is a discrimination of equity financ-
ing in most countries. Accordingly, the study proposes changes for equity financing in corpo-
rate SMEs. First of all, equity financing should be treated similar to the interest treatment of 
debt financing. The idea is that a certain equity interest rate should be used to reduce the 
profit of a company as seen in Austria. The interest rate as well as the amount of interest de-
ductible from the tax base should be in accordance to the regulations for debt financing. Fur-
thermore, we propose specific tax rates for young SMEs. Here a lower tax rate than the regu-
lar corporate tax rate should be used. The third recommendation aims at the treatment of 
losses. We support the transfer of losses on future tax years for SMEs. That transfer should be 
unlimited. To enhance liquidity and financial resources of young SMEs for start-ups, even a 
backward transfer of losses on entrepreneur’s income in previous periods should be consid-
ered. 
For partnerships and sole proprietorships, we propose a possibility to change the tax scheme 
within  a  certain  period.  The  change  from  individual  income  tax  to  corporate  income  tax 
should be possible once in the life-time of a SME.  
(9) The debt financing of SMEs is privileged in all countries except Austria. Accordingly, 
these countries have established thin capitalisation rules. We propose that these thin capitali-
sation rules are either abolished or at least only used for offshore financed businesses with 
European Union and non EU countries. Thin capitalisation rules should not be applicable to 
any business within the European Union.  Access to Finance and Venture  
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(10) The tax burden on venture capital, in general, is very much in accordance to the tax 
regulation for any corporation. The main point of discussion, however, is the issue on the 
value change of the shares kept by a venture capitalist. We propose three changes. First of all, 
extraordinary depreciation makes only sense, if, and only if, it is in accordance to the tax sys-
tems. That means, only if gains from value changes are subject to tax, the losses should be 
subject, too. Secondly, we propose that in the case that gains and losses of the value of the 
share owned by venture capitalists are subject to taxes, losses should be treated as any other 
investment, too. Thus, a transfer and a retransfer to previous or later periods should be possi-
ble. Finally we propose that realised capital gains by value changes of the shares should be 
treated according to a special tax scheme. Here the United Kingdom is a good example. Fur-
thermore, a roll over relief should be provided.  
Based on these recommendations, substantial changes in the access of SMEs to financial re-
sources might take place. Under these conditions the incentive for SMEs to enhance their eq-
uity share as well as the incentive for further investments can be expected.  
2  Introduction 
(1) The study “access to finance and venture capital for industrial SMEs” analyses the acces-
sibility of financial resources for European SMEs. In the Lisbon goals an improvement of the 
access of SMEs to financial resources has been explicitly stated as a political target. Accord-
ingly, it is the main objective of the study to provide information on five issues. 
1.  The relevance of SMEs for the European economies will be analysed. 
2.  Based on the importance of SMEs for various European economies, the financial 
structure of these SMEs is subject of the study. The main focus here will be laid 
on the kinds of financial resources used by SMEs in selected countries. 
3.  The availability of venture capital will be researched. Here, on one hand, the 
availability of venture capital in Europe, is subject of the study. On the other 
hand, an in depth analysis of the availability of venture capital in selected coun-
tries will be conducted. 
4.  The study explores the tax situation for heterogeneous financing schemes. The 
main idea behind that part is to identify differences in the treatment of debt and 
equity financing by national tax laws. 
5.  Last but not least, recommendations for an improvement of the access of SMEs to 
financial resources are developed. Access to Finance and Venture  
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(2) The five topics will be analysed in-depth for five selected countries. The following coun-
tries are selected for the analysis: Austria, France, Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom. 
A number of considerations has lead to the selection of those countries. On the one hand, 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom are the large economies of the European Union. 
On the other hand, Austria represents a small but strong economy of the EU, and last but not 
least, Poland is a representative of the new member states, who are still in a transition from 
their former economic system to a market economy. Accordingly, the five countries represent 
the variety of European economies and can thus be seen as a good benchmark for all the other 
countries of the European Union.  
(3) The study is based on the analysis of existing material. In addition, interviews with experts 
have been conducted. 
3  The Lisbon Strategy – Impact on Financing Innovative SMEs 
(1) In the Lisbon Agenda of Economic and Social Renewal by the European Council, the 
overall political aims were fixed in the year 2000 as 
•  “to establish an inclusive, dynamic and knowledge based economy, 
•  to produce accelerated and sustained economic growth, 
•  to restore full employment as the key objective of economic and social policy, 
and reduce unemployment to the levels already achieved by the best performing 
countries, and 
•  to modernise our social protection systems”.
2 
The  European  Commission  stated  that  one  priority  for  economic  reforms  was  to  develop 
European entrepreneurship: Europe shall become more entrepreneurial and innovative. Jobs in 
the new economy – as it was seen in 2000 – should primarily be created by vibrant small and 
medium sized firms, with a small number of them growing rapidly to become leading global 
companies. 
(2) In 2000, the European Commission called for a twin strategy: First, Europe should build 
up a dynamic business environment in which companies can be created, grow, and innovate 
within competitive markets. It has to be an attractive and simple environment that really helps 
small businesses, and it has to be supported by risk capital finance and by an effective 
innovation policy. 
                                                 
2 The Lisbon European Council – An Agenda of Economic and Social Renewal for Europe, Contribution of the 
European Commission to the special European Council in Lisbon, 23 – 24
th March 2000, DOC/00/7. Access to Finance and Venture  
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Research was seen as the second factor for future economic growth. As research and tech-
nology account for between 25% and 50% of economic growth, they are the principle driving 
forces for competitiveness and employment. The European Commission agreed that, in the 
global economy, technology and research lead to tomorrow’s jobs. The use of tax and risk 
capital incentives to stimulate research was seen as one of the key elements. Setting com-
mon objectives for improving the environment for private investment in research, and for cre-
ating technological “start-ups” in Europe was defined as a target for 2002. 
(3) On 19-20 June 2000, the European Charter for Small Enterprises was approved by EU 
leaders at the Feira European Council. The Charter called upon Member States and the Com-
mission to take action to support and encourage small enterprises in ten key areas, one of 
them being “Taxation and financial matters”. The aim was to achieve a regulatory, fiscal and 
administrative framework conductive to entrepreneurial activity and to improve access to fi-
nance throughout the entire life-cycle of an enterprise. By endorsing the Charter, EU leaders 
committed themselves to adapt tax systems to reward success, encourage start-ups, fa-
vour small business expansions and job creations, and facilitate the creation and the 
succession in small enterprises. In order to improve small enterprises´ access to financial 
services, the following activities are mentioned: 
•  Identification and removal of barriers to the creation of a pan-European capital 
market and to the implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan and the 
Risk Capital Action Plan; 
•  Improvement of the relationship between the banking system and small enter-
prises by creating appropriate access conditions to credit and to venture capital; 
and 
•  Improvement of the access and the structural funds and welcoming initiatives by 
the European Investment Bank in order to increase funding available to start-ups 
and high-technology enterprises, including equity instruments. 
(4) Five years later, the Lisbon action plan of 3 February 2005
3 states an “innovation gap” 
that reflects – beyond others – weaknesses in the availability of early stage finance. E.g., 
ICTs contribute 40% of total productivity growth – but European investments in ICT repre-
sent about 20% of total R&D spent, as compared to 30% in the United States. On EU level a 
solution is expected by better access to financing for innovative enterprises by 
•  lifting intra-EU barriers for cross-border activity for venture capital firms, 
•  giving young, innovative companies better access to EU research funds, and 
                                                 
3 See Lisbon Action Plan incorporating EU Lisbon Programme and recommendations for actions to Member 
States for inclusion in their national Lisbon Programmes, Brussels, 4 February 2005, SEC(2005)192. Access to Finance and Venture  
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•  revising EU state aid for innovative and risk capital (i.e. a revision of the legal 
framework for State Aid for innovation and risk capital plus an examination of 
new financial instruments in support of innovative enterprises). 
(5) On the member state level, financial support from the Community should be used for joint 
participation. Member states are invited to share best practice to support innovative enter-
prises and to open national and regional support schemes. 
Additionally, it is stated that innovation is closely related to the willingness to take risks and 
test new ideas on the market, and that the availability of venture capital is crucial. Both fac-
tors are directly linked to the financing of innovative SMEs. 
(6) In Central Policy Area No. 6: Facilitate Innovation, the uptake of ICT and the sustainabil-
ity use of resources policy measures at Community level are defined. One of them is to facili-
tate access to finance for innovative enterprises. The legal framework for State Aid has to be 
revised, including State Aid and innovation, risk capital, and Regional State Aid guide-
lines. Additionally, the communication on Venture Capital should be enforced, including the 
lifting  of  legal,  administrative  and  tax  barriers  to  cross-border  activity  of  venture-
capital funds, and the improvement of exit mechanisms to encourage investment. Ex-
penses should be raised for the adoption of High Growth and Innovative SME Facility (GIF) 
within CIP. It is supposed that these measures will enhance the creation and growth of inno-
vative enterprises, ease the development of new knowledge based industries, and improve 
competitiveness by leading to an increase in innovation and resource efficiency. 
4  Analysis of SMEs and Their Financial Structure in Selected Countries 
(1) For our study the relevance of SME in general as well as information on the financial 
structure of SMEs is of high importance. Thus the two issues will be discussed in the follow-
ing. The chapter starts with a brief introduction to the structure and economic importance of 
SMEs in Europe in general and the selected countries in particular.  
(2) The chapter is followed by a discussion of the financial structure of the SME. Here a spe-
cial emphasis will be put on equity ratios as well as kinds and shares of credits forming the 
financial makeup of SMEs. 
4.1  Analysis of the Economic Importance of SMEs in Europe and in Par-
ticular in the Selected Countries 
(1) SME play an important role in the economy of all countries selected for this report. They 
are an important factor regarding employment, number of companies, contribution to GDP as 
well as innovation.  Access to Finance and Venture  
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The definition of companies perceived as SMEs varies among the European Union member 
states. So Germany, for instance, defines SMEs as companies with up to 499 employees, a 
turnover of up to €50 Million and up to 25% shares held by a non-SME. 
(2) For a European comparison of SMEs, the definition given by the European Commission is 
the most suitable. That definition is compulsory for all project funding. Most statistics on 
SME are based on that particular definition. 
The European Commission’s definition of SMEs is based on three criteria. These are number 
of employees, turnover per year and balance sheet size per year. In addition, the Commission 
allows a maximum share by an LSE of 25% or below. 
The number of employees is counted by annual work units (AWU) that represent annual full-
time headcounts. AWU are still the most important criterion used for the definition of SMEs. 
The balance sheet total as well as the turnover is measured annually. The independency is 
defined in capital and voting rights. A company is called independent if the influence of a 
shareholder is limited. In the last recommendation released by the European Commission, the 
following factors define three distinct company categories: 







Source:  European Commission  2003, Commission Recommendation of 06/05/2003 
  concerning  the  definition  of  micro,  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises, 
  Brussels 
All numbers represent maximum limits. Member states, EIB and EIF are entitled to lower 
their definition of the categories. 
(3) Based on that definition the importance of SMEs in the selected countries as well as in 
Europe generally can be calculated. The European Observatory (2003) has just recently pre-
sented the last results in their study “SMEs in Europe 2003”.  Access to Finance and Venture  
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Source:  European Commission, European Observatory 2003, SMEs in Europe 2003, p. 
    27 
The data shows clearly that about 2/3 of the total employment in Europe is at SMEs. In addi-
tion SMEs provide more than 99% of all enterprises. Amongst SMEs, micro enterprises pro-
vide the largest number of firms as well of employment. However their share in the total turn-
over of all SMEs is fairly small as is their value generation. 
(4) For the study, however, the European data is only of limited interest. For the focus of the 
study the structure in the selected countries is of higher importance. Here we see that there is 
a fairly large variety among those countries (e. g. Germany, UK) that feature rather large en-
terprises compared to Austria and France in which micro enterprises are the dominant com-
pany size. 
Table 3:  Dominant company structure in the selected countries 
Country  No.  of  enterprises  in 
1000 
Occupied persons per 
enterprise 
Size-class dominance 
Austria  270  11  Micro 
France  2,500  8  Micro 
Germany  3,020  10  LSE 
United Kingdom  2,230  11  LSE 
Source:  European Commission, European Observatory 2003, SMEs in Europe 2003, p. 
    27 Access to Finance and Venture  
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The contribution to the GDP of SMEs in the selected countries is fairly high. The European 
Observatory shows that the contribution of SMEs in Europe 19 to GDP is about 50%. It is 
however also stated that labour productivity and profitability of SMEs in all 19 European 
countries is below average. That shows the ambivalence of SMEs. On the one hand, they pro-
vide most of the enterprises and stand for a large proportion of the employment. On the other, 
their economic outcome in average is below the outcome of all other enterprises (European 
Observatory, 2003, p. 28). 
(5) Poland still faces a strong influence from its transition to a market economy. An average 
unemployment rate of 20% in 2003, combined with a GNP growth rate of about 4% is not 
sufficient to gain economic momentum (cf. Polish Agency for Enterprise Development, 2004, 
Report on the Condition of Small and Medium Sized Enterprise Sector in Poland 2002 – 
2003, chap. 1). The transition stage of the Polish economy is also visible in the distribution 
between public and private enterprises. The number of new private companies is still increas-
ing and the amount of state owned enterprises is decreasing. The development is shown in the 
following figure: 










Source:  Copernicus Finance (ed.), 09/2003, Poland in the EU – Business and Invest-
    ment Opportunities, Warsaw.  Access to Finance and Venture  
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The situation of privatised SMEs in Poland is quite similar to those in Austria and France with 
a dominance of micro enterprises. In a recent report published by The Economist Intelligence 
Unit
4 the data on the structure of Polish SMEs has been shown. 











Source:   The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2004, The challenges of enlargement: SME 
    growth strategies in Central Europe, p. 4. 
The graph illustrates the high number of micro size SMEs in Poland. In total there were more 
than 1.73 million SMEs registered in 2002 (Polish Agency for Enterprise Development, 2004, 
p. 28). They represent more than 48% of the total GDP of Poland. The contribution of the 
various company size-classes is shown in the following graph. 
                                                 
4 See The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2004, The challenges of enlargement: SME growth strategies in Central 
Europe Access to Finance and Venture  





Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 97  19 
 










Source:   International Small Business Congress, 2004, Small and Medium-Sized Enter
    prises on the Integrating World Market,  
    http://www.isbc2004.pl/isbc/index.php?k=msp_w_polsce&l=en 
 
The SMEs in Poland employ over 67% of all employees. Accordingly the impact of SMEs on 
the Polish economy is fairly strong. Again, Micro enterprises are of major importance here. 
4.2  Financial Structure of SMEs in Selected Countries 
(1) The variety amongst financial markets in Europe is still strong. Countries like Germany, 
for instance, show a highly segmented financial market, whilst the one in the UK is fairly con-
centrated. Accordingly, the financial environment for SMEs is quite heterogeneous. Further-
more, the kinds of financing used by SMEs are quite heterogeneous among the European 
countries. In the UK capital market based financing is of larger importance than in Germany. 
By contrast, bank loans in Germany are still the dominant financial resource for SMEs (see 
Ade et al. 2004; PwC 2004a, p. 89).  
(2) There seems to be a clear segmentation in bank based systems and capital market based 
systems in Europe (Canepa, A., P. Stoneman, 2004, Financial constraints to Innovation in 
Europe – Evidence and Policy). That is also seen in the debt to equity ratio. That ratio informs 
about the equity share of SMEs. In retrospect, a sharp reduction of the equity ratio can be 
identified in several European countries. German SMEs, for instance, had an average equity 
ratio of above 30% in the 60s. Today the average equity ratio has decreased to less than 20% Access to Finance and Venture  





Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 97  20 
 
in average. In some countries we find that SMEs strongly depend on credit financing. The 
following figure shows the context for 15 selected EU countries in 2000. 
Table 4:  Capital and reserves (equity), by sector, enterprise size and country in 










Source:   European Commission, 2003, SMEs and access to finance, p 21 
As the numbers show in countries like Austria and Germany the average equity ratios are in 
the range of about 5% to 42% for all SMEs in the sectors considered. The variety among sev-
eral size classes, however, is fairly large. In Germany, for instance, micro-enterprises have 
almost  an  average  equity  ratio  of  about  0%  (Deutsche  Bundesbank,  Monthly  Report 
(Monatsbericht) October 2003, p. 43).  
(3) There is not only a large variety in the composition of credit and equity financing. Even 
the debt financing itself is subject to large variations. The following figure shows the compo-
sition of kinds of debt financing among European countries. Access to Finance and Venture  
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Source:   European Commission, 2003, SMEs and access to finance, p 20 
As is illustrated in the graph for medium enterprises, bank loans play a crucial role in financ-
ing SMEs especially in Austria, France and Germany. In the UK bank loans are of less impor-
tance. It is quite interesting to see, that modern financing tools like factoring not play a crucial 
role in most countries does. It is quite obvious that there is room for improvement in many 
European countries. 
(4) It has been claimed frequently that SMEs in Europe suffer from a credit crunch. It is stated 
that the credit crunch is initiated by the economic downturn and the establishment of the Basel 
II  Accord.  However,  many  studies  show  that  statistics  refute  the  assumption  of  a  credit 
crunch. It can be shown that bank lending on average has not turned downwards but SMEs 
even got an increasing share of the loan portfolio during the last years (see Wagenvoort, R., 
2003, Bank survey evidence on “bank lending to SME in the European Union”, in EIB (ed.), 
Economic and Financial Report 2003/01, p. 37). 
Furthermore, all studies show that the Basel II Accord will not increase financing costs for 
SMEs. In particular, a study conducted by PwC (2004a) shows that in most European coun-
tries SMEs will face decreasing credit cost on average.  Access to Finance and Venture  
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Source:   PwC, 2004a, Study on the financial and macroeconomic consequences of the 
    draft that proposed new capital requirements for banks and investment firms in 
    the EU, p. 48. 
The average view may however not lead to the assumption that all SMEs will be subject to 
lower credit cost. In particular those SMEs, which suffered from poor economic results in the 
past as well as those SMEs in the early stage, will probably face higher cost. On the other 
hand, those SMEs with a solid financial and economic track will be subject to reduced capital 
cost.
5  
The general results will now be transferred to the national context of the selected countries. 
4.2.1  Financing of SMEs in Austria 
(1) Austrian SMEs show quite a small average equity ratio compared to other European coun-
tries (cf. Heimer, T., Köhler, T. 2004). Austrian SMEs are pretty much financed by debt and 
bank loans in particular. The spread of the average equity ratio among various class sizes of 
SMEs as well as of various sectors is large compared to other European countries. In particu-
lar the hotel and restaurant sector, which is of high economic relevance for the Austrian Econ-
omy, exhibit tremendously low equity ratios. The average equity ratio of Austrian SMEs in 
                                                 
5 An in depth analysis of the impact of the Basel II Accord on SME is also available in Ade et al., 2004 for Euro-
pean SMEs and for Austrian SMEs in particular in Heimer, T., T. Köhler 2004. Access to Finance and Venture  
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the hotel and restaurant sector (NACE 55) is even negative for the last years. Accordingly, 
Austrian SMEs are strongly depending on banks.  









Source:   Own calculations.  
(2) Based on the numbers shown it is not surprising that Austrian SMEs frequently notice that 
their access to finance is fairly difficult (see Heimer, T., Köhler, T. 2004). 
4.2.2  Financing of SMEs in France 
(1) France shows a higher equity to debt ratio than Austria and Germany. In average the eq-
uity ratio of French SMEs in the manufacturing sector is about 33%. Thus there is a signifi-
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Source:   Dietsch, M., 2003, Financing Small Business in France, EIB Papers, Vol 8, No. 
    2, p. 96. 
It is quite interesting to see, that the equity of debt ratio spread among various size classes in 
France is fairly small. In opposite to other countries, for example Germany, even micro enter-
prises show a relatively high equity ratio. 










Source:   Dietsch, M., 2003, p. 97. Access to Finance and Venture  
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(2) On the debt side, bank debts play a major role in France. In 1999 French SMEs got about 
40% of total company loans. That is about the share of investments taken by SMEs. It seems 
therefore, that SMEs in France have improved their share of total company loans to a fair 
level compared to large enterprises.  
4.2.3  Financing of SMEs in Germany 
(1) Germany has developed a severe equity weakness within the last decades. Primarily due to 
tax reasons, the average equity share of German SMEs has declined from 31% in 1967 to 17% 
in 1994 (see Hommel, U., H. Schneider, 2003, Financing the German Mittelstand, EIB Pa-
pers, Vol 8, No. 2, p. 60). As is illustrated by the following figure, the capital structure of the 
German Mittelstand is dominated by debt financing. 










Source:   Hommel, U., H. Schneider, 2003, p. 59 
(2) The low equity ratio is partly based on tax reasons; partly it is a direct outcome of a strong 
resistance by German SMEs to equity contributions by private equity companies or business 
angels. That is in particular true for micro-enterprises, as can be seen in the following graph.  Access to Finance and Venture  
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Fig. 9:  Median capital structure of German Mittelstand firms by size class in 2000 in % of bal-









Source:   Hommel, U., H. Schneider, 2003, p.62 
(3) This low prevalence of equity in German SMEs is also visible when analysing the financ-
ing instruments used by SMEs. Here private equity plays a minor role compared to financing 
with earnings and debt financing. It is quite interesting that that results is fairly stable over all 
SME size classes. Access to Finance and Venture  
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Source:   Hommel, U., H. Schneider, 2003, p.72 Access to Finance and Venture  
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4.2.4  Financing of SMEs in Poland 
(1) The situation in Poland in regard to financing is less favourable as in the western Euro-
pean countries. Since the Polish companies still struggle with the transition from the former 
economic system there is hardly any reliable data for Poland. However, some numbers indi-
cate that the access of Polish SMEs to finance is fairly difficult. From the following table it 
can be seen that a large amount of investments taken by Polish SMEs have been self-financed. 
The share is even growing from 2001 to 2002. Obviously, the general access to finance is still 
a major problem of Polish SMEs. 
Table 7:  Structure of investment expenditures by enterprises with more than 





Source:   Polish Agency for Enterprise Development, 2004, p. 53 
(2) The prices for debt financing in Poland is the highest compared to all countries under con-
sideration. Accordingly, the leverage effect that exists in all other selected countries is small 
in Poland. However, Polish companies primarily struggle with the general transition of their 
economy. 
4.2.5  Financing of SMEs in the UK 
(1) British SMEs show comparatively high equity ratios. The financing of British SMEs by 
external equity is also at the upper scale of all European countries.  
(2) Debt financing in the United Kingdom is done with all kinds of external financing. British 
SMEs show a rather high appreciation of overdrafts and leasing financing. It has been ana-
lysed that British enterprises, and in particular SMEs, do not complain about financing cost 
(see von Kalckreuth, U., E. Murphy, 2005, p. 16). In particular overdrafts seem to be quite 
expensive compared to other financing tools. The following table and figure gives the num-
bers.  Access to Finance and Venture  
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Source:   Bank of England, 2002, Quarterly Report on Small Business Statistics, p. 41 
Furthermore, the Small Business Service (SBS) within the scope of the Small Firms Loan 
Guarantee Scheme guarantees are dedicated to SMEs which have insufficient securities for 
commercial bank lending to receive loans from banks that take part in the project. Addition-
ally, the Corporate Venturing Scheme was established by the government in 2002 to encour-
age Corporate Venture Capitalists to invest in unquoted trading SMEs through the instrument 
of tax reduction for equity investments. 








Source:   Bank of England, 2002, Quarterly Report on Small Business Statistics, p. 37 
Although it is always emphasised that UK SMEs have a higher equity ratio than continental 
European SMEs the British government still tries to improve the access of early stage SMEs 
to finance. DTI with the “Government Action Plan for Small Business” has started initiatives 
to make the access to finance easier for early stage SMEs. The British government still tries to 
enhance the access of SMEs to equity.  
 Access to Finance and Venture  
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5  Analysis of the Venture Capital Market in Selected Countries 
The following chapter discusses the availability of venture capital in Europe and in the se-
lected countries. A special focus is also laid on young technology enterprises. 
5.1  Introduction to the European Venture Capital Market 
(1) The following paragraphs are dealing with the situation of the Venture Capital sector in 
France, United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, and Poland. Furthermore, a special focus in this 
survey is on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in the early stage, in combination with a 
general overview of Venture Capital in the European Union (EU). 
(2) Looking at the funds raised in Europe in the year 2003, a total amount of €27 billion was 
brought up, which is down from €27.53 billion in the year 2002. The indicator “funds raised 
per capita in 2003” shows how many funds per capita were collected in the selected countries 
(Fig. 11). 










Source:   EVCA 2004, OECD 2004  
(3) In terms of investments taken place in the European Union including countries like Swit-
zerland, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, the year 2003 was quite successful. 
With an amount of €29.1 billion, which was the second best year after 2000 with €34.9 billion 
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pared to the amount of €27.6 billion invested in 2002. With an amount of €13.5 billion which 
is 46.5% of the total investment amount in the year 2003, the biggest absolute contributor 
regarding country of investment management is the United Kingdom. Second in that category 
was France (14.6%, €4.2 billion) followed by Italy (10.4%, €3 billion) (Fig. 12). Even though 
the United Kingdom is managing an amount of €13.5 billion, the targets of the investments 
are not entirely national companies as Fig. 2 shows. About 54% of the country’s investment 
contribution is being invested in foreign countries. 










Source:   EVCA 2004 
(4) Beyond the mentioned absolute amounts of investment the indicator “investments per cap-
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Source:   EVCA 2004, OECD 2004 
With regard to investments in the early stage, which implies seed as well as start-up invest-
ments, the total investments in that area decreased in 2003 in comparison to 2002. Seed in-
vestments dropped from 1.1% of total investments and €305 million in 2002, down to 0.6% of 
total investments and €165 million in 2003. A downswing took place in start-up investments 
as well. Still at 9.5% (€2.6 billion) of total investments in 2002 the contribution decreased in 
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Source:   EVCA 2004 
(5) Contrary to the shares and amounts of total investments in the seed and start-up phase, the 
investments by number look quite favourable for 2003. 3.6% of all investments with 377 in-
vestments in the seed phase and 3229 investments in the start-up phase (31.1% total number 
of investments) were made. However, even these numbers are low compared to the results in 
2002 (seed phase 5.8% total number of investments, start-up phase: 33.6% total number of 
investments) (Fig. 15). 
The share of the total amount for early stage investments shrinks every year (Deloitte 2004). 
Countries which show the highest seed investment amounts are France, Denmark and Poland. 
For start-up investments Portugal (48% of their total national investments), Greece (44.6% of 
their total national investments) and Switzerland (37.4% of their total national investments) 
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Source:   EVCA 2004 
(6) Concerning the average investment size the seed investments dropped on average from 
€515,000 in 2002 to €438,000 in 2003. In that category the average investments in start-ups 
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Source:   EVCA 2004 
The largest share of investments (77%), as well as the largest total investment (28.5%), were 
placed into small and medium companies which employ less than 100 people. Companies 
with 100 to 1,000 employees received 29.1% (€6.1 billion) of the total investment amount and 
represented 19.1% of the total. Companies employing 19 people or less represented 46.5% of 
the total number of investments. With €8.9 billion (42.5% of the total investment amount) a 
considerable amount was invested into companies employing more than 1,000 people (Fig. 
16). In comparison, the share in 2002 was still 50.3%.  
Table 9:  Investments 2002/2003 by number of employees 
 
Source:   EVCA 2004 
in € x 1,000 2002 2003
% % % %
0 - 19 2023030 8,7 2346 38,7 862 1883077 9 2857 46,5 659
20 - 99 3475082 14,9 2372 39,2 1465 4065290 19,5 1850 30,1 2198
100 - 199 1365026 5,9 501 8,3 2725 1668413 8 528 8,6 3157
200 - 499 2825990 12,1 381 6,3 7417 1457260 7 449 7,3 3248
500 - 999 1887982 8,1 212 3,5 8906 2941008 14,1 197 3,2 14948
1000 - 4999 6653185 28,6 189 3,1 35202 4312891 20,7 202 3,3 21306
5000+ 5045672 21,7 57 0,9 88521 4556974 21,8 62 1 73744
Sub - total 23275967 100 6058 100 20884912 100 6144 100
Unknown 4372414 4171 4601333 4231
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The average investment size differs strongly depending on the company size with regard to 
the number of employees. Companies employing less than 20 people received an average in-
vestment of €659,000, companies with less than 100 people received €2.2 million and compa-
nies with more than 1,000 employees received €33.6 million on average (Tab. 9). 
Different amounts of funds raised and amounts of investment in one year are not directly 
comparable. The funds raised will not necessarily be invested in the same year. 
5.2  The European Private Equity Technology Market 
Technologies are one important driver for future business in developed countries. Therefore, 
investments  in  technologies  play  a  crucial  role  for  a  further  development  and  sustainable 
growth. In total, 46% of all private equity investments in Europe by number, when compared 
with 47% in 2002, have been made in technologies. Technology investments in Europe in-
creased by 2% to €5.4 billion in 2003. Technology investments in 2002 were €5.3 billion as 
shown in Fig. 17. This modest recovery stopped the consecutive sharp declines in the previ-
ous two years, which saw technology investment collapse by some 29% in 2002 and 35% in 
2001. 










Source:   PricewaterhouseCoopers 2004  
According to the definition used in the PricewaterhouseCoopers report (Money for Growth, 
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eas:  Communications,  Computer  Related,  Other  Electronics  Related,  Biotechnology  and 
Medical: Instruments/Devices. The sub sectors included within the technology cluster were 
refined in 1999. For example Internet Technology was included as a separate category for the 
first time in 1999. 
“Technology” from 1999 onwards now excludes: 
•  Communications (other) – TV and radio broadcasting, media houses, publishing 
•  Medical : Healthcare – health institutions, hospital management, handicap aids & 
basic healthcare supplies 
•  Medical: Pharmaceuticals – drug development, manufacture & supply. 
 
Computer Related – which includes Computer Hardware, Computer Software, Computer Ser-
vices and Semiconductors – remained the largest single category within technology invest-
ment overall in 2003, accounting for 34% of the total amount invested at €1.8 billion. If 
Medical/Health Related is included with Biotechnology, then the overall Life Sciences indus-
try claims a clear second place with €1.4 billion. The next largest categories in terms of 
amount invested were Communications, which rose by 8% to €1.2 billion, and Biotechnology, 
which fell by 38% to €0.7 billion, its lowest level since 1999. Two other sub sectors bounced 
back following sharp declines in 2002 – Internet Technology and Other Electronics Related. 
The Technology private equity investments amount by sector is shown in Fig. 18.  Access to Finance and Venture  
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Source:  PwC 2004 
The investment behaviour in the Technology sector was markedly different from country to 
country. The UK regained its first position from France in terms of private equity investment 
in technology. The technology investments rose by 93% to €2 billion, accounting for 38% of 
the European total. France slipped to second place with its investments during 2003 falling by 
23% to €1 billion, or 18% of total European technology investment. Italy increased its in-
vestment by 87% to €0.5 billion and claiming third place ahead of Germany, whose level of 
investments fell by 36% to €0.4 billion, having already fallen by 59% in 2002. Sweden fell 
from third to fifth, with investment down 60% at €0.34 billion, but Ireland performed strongly 
to take sixth place, with investment up 175% at €0.25 billion. 
In terms of the number of deals, the UK stayed at the fore with 1,148 deals, putting it well 
clear of France in second place with 987 deals. Germany was third with 516 deals, down from 
676 the previous year. Among the biggest private equity markets, Sweden’s 33%, France’s 
22% and Germany’s 17% high-tech share were all ahead of the UK’s 15%.  
Marked differences emerged in the proportion of technology investments known as venture 
capital. Taking Europe as a whole, €3.1 billion of venture capital was invested via 4,354 in-
vestments which between them financed 2,785 companies. This represented 57% of the total 
technology investment amount, and 91% in terms of the number of deals. In Germany, ven-
ture capital accounted only for 57% of private equity investment in 2003, which is a remark-
able decline, given that venture capital accounted for 100% of investment in Germany in 
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UK, Europe’s leading private equity market, 42% of investments went into venture capital, 
accounting for 88% of the total number of deals. In France, venture capital investments made 
up €0.6 billion out of a total of €1 billion in private equity investments, equating to 67% by 
value and 91% by number of deals. In Italy, venture capital at €0.3 billion accounted for 57% 
of total investment and 90% of the number of deals. 
Austria, the Czech Republic and Switzerland had the highest proportions invested in technol-
ogy seed, start-up and other early-stage investments, at 61%, 56% and 55%, respectively. Ex-
cluding the smaller countries, the UK, the Netherlands and Poland had the lowest shares at 
this stage with 21%, 18% and 1%, respectively. The biggest market, the UK, invested 21% at 
the expansion stage, the same as at the seed/start-up stage. Ireland had the highest proportion 
going into technology buyouts relative to other stages at 71%, followed by the UK with 55%, 
Portugal with 42% and then three countries on 39% – Germany, Italy and Spain. 
5.2.1  United Kingdom 
(1) The funds raised in the United Kingdom in the years 2001 (about €13.9 billion), 2002 
(€14.2 billion) and 2003 (about €15 billion) increased constantly on a very high level. A big 
amount of funds raised resulted from activities outside of the United Kingdom (in particular) 
from the US and Asia. The business ratio “funds raised per capita” also shows the strongly 
increasing development (Fig. 19). 
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Private equity companies in the United Kingdom invested a total amount of €13.5 billion in 
2003 compared to €10.1 billion in 2002. As already mentioned, the amount invested in the 
United Kingdom represents 46.5% of the total investments in the European Union (including 
Switzerland). In the year 2002, this amount was already at a remarkable share of 38%. Con-
sidering the indicator “investments per capita” a strong boost can be noted from the years 
2001 to 2003 (Fig. 20). 










Source:   EVCA 2003, EVCA 2004, OECD 2004 
This increase can be reasoned by the level of investment at the buyout stage. The investments 
in the buyout stage alone account for €9.5 billion in the year 2003 (2002: €7.3 billion) or 70% 
(2002: 71.8%) of the total investment amount. The amount of investments in the early stage 
increased from €8,162 million in 2002, which is 0.1% of the total investment amount of this 
year, up to €28,646 million and 0.2% of the total investment amount of 2003. The amount of 
investment in the start-up stage, in contrast, dropped from 5.8% in 2002 down to 4.4% of the 
total amount of investment in 2003, although the absolute amount of investment rose from 
€590,305 million in 2002 up to €593,013 million in the United Kingdom in 2003. A decrease 
of the total amount of investment was registered in the expansion stage. The share dropped 
from 19.2% in 2002 down to 14.5% in 2003, even if the absolute amount of investment was 
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Source:   EVCA 2004, Amount of Investment (in %) 
(2) It is quite astonishing, that the number of investments of British equity firms in companies 
in the seed stage amounted to just 65 in 2003 although the number of investments increased 
by 170% compared to 2002 (24 investments). The number of investments in the seed stage 
represents 2.6% of the total number of investments in 2003. In 2002, 1% of the total number 
of investments was done in the early stage. A decrease of number of investments in 2003 
compared to 2002 was registered in the start-up stage where 710 investments (28.3% of total 
number  of  investments)  were  made.  These  are  124  investments  less  than  the  year  before 
(2002: 33.3% of total number of investments). The largest number of investments was made 
in the expansion stage. In the year 2002 with 1009 investments and 40.4% of total numbers of 
investments, as well as in 2003 with 1074 investments and 42.8% of total numbers of invest-
ments, were the leading investment aims in that category (Fig. 21). 
(3) The British Government undertook several improvements in the legal and fiscal environ-
ment concerning the financing of SMEs. The Venture Capital Trusts (VCTs) for example, 
which are open to private investors only, provide individual tax incentives for investing in 
SMEs, even those SMEs which are noted on the stock exchange. Yet another scheme of the 
British Government to support venture capital investments in early stage companies and com-
panies in the technology sector, is to establish the Enterprise Capital Funds (ECFs) which will 
embrace private and government sources to raise capital. The intention is to close the “equity 
gap” between business angel financing and private equity financing for venture investments. 
Governmental changes in VCTs will undertake changes in terms of income tax reliefs for in-
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5.2.2  France 
(1) The total amount of raised funds dropped from €4.8 billion in 2002 to €2 billion in 2003. 
This massive downswing is shown in Fig. 22. 










Source:   EVCA 2003, EVCA 2004, OECD 2004 
The total investment of private equity dropped in France to €4.2 billion in 2003 compared to 
€5.9 billion in 2002. The main reason is the transaction of a few large buy-outs in 2002 which 
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Source:   EVCA 2003, EVCA 2004, OECD 2004 
(2) Concerning the amount of investment, the investments in seed stage companies decreased 
to €31.3 million (0.7% of total amount of investment) in 2003 compared to €50 million (0.9% 
of total amount of investment) in 2003. Firms in the start-up stage received less investments 
in 2003 with €363.7 million when compared with the year 2002 with €443.4 million, even 
though the share of amount of investment increased in 2003 (8.6% of total amount of invest-
ment in France) compared to 2002 (7.6% of total amount of investment). A big increase can 
be noted in the amount of investment in the expansion stage. €1009.3 million went into that 
stage in 2003 (2002: €755.4 million). The share of 23.8% of the total amount of investment in 
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Source:   EVCA 2004 
(3) The number of investments in France decreased in the seed stage from 108 (6.1% of total 
number of investments) in 2002 to 70 (3.3% of total number of investments) in 2003. A drop 
can be noted as well in the number of investments in the start-up stage, where 645 (30.8% of 
total number of investments) investments were made compared to 709 (39.9% of total number 
of investments) in 2002. An increase took place in the expansion stage where 815 investments 
in 2003 were made when compared to the year 2002 with 594 investments. The share of 39% 
of the total number of investments in 2003 compared to 33.4% in 2002 shows that a main 
focus in investments in France is on the expansion stage (Fig. 24). 
(4) A new law concerning the increase of the economic spirit of enterprise passed in France in 
August of 2003 called the Dutreil Law, named after Renaud Dutreil, the former minister for 
small and medium business and now the minister for civil service and administrative reform. 
One of the improvements is the Fonds d’Investissement de Proximité (FIP), which is a fond to 
increase the growth of regional firms with less than 500 employees. Furthermore, the new law 
includes tax reductions for investors and private firms which is an appeal for hi-tech compa-
nies to invest more intensely in research and development through the instruments of tax de-
creases as well as social charges. A second law for economic initiative is currently in progress 




























Seed Start-up Expansion Replacement Capital Buyout
Amount of Investment (%)
2002 2002 2003 2003
Number of Investments (%)Access to Finance and Venture  





Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 97  45 
 
5.2.3  Poland 
(1) Fund raising activity declined in 2003 (€25.7 million) compared to 2002 (€118.6 million). 
A possible reason for the decrease is the collection of essential funds in the years before, mak-
ing it unnecessary for the private equity companies to look for more capital. Fig. 25 demon-
strates the weakening of the funds raised. 










Source:   EVCA 2003, EVCA 2004, OECD 2004 
About 35 companies, mostly from foreign countries, manage private equity funds in Poland at 
the present time. A small rise can be seen in the size per investment. The indicator “invest-
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Source:   EVCA 2003, EVCA 2004, OECD 2004 
(2) In the year 2002, there was no amount of investment registered for the seed stage, but in 
the year 2003, the amount for seed stage was at €15.1 million which represents a share of 
11.3% of the total amount invested in Poland. As opposed to the development in the seed 
stage, the start-up stage as well as the expansion stage decreased in terms of amount of in-
vestment in 2003 compared to 2002. Start-up investments fell from €9.8 million in 2002 
(8.3% of total amount of investment) to about €2 million (1.5% of total amount of invest-
ment) in 2003. Thus, early stage investments are representing 12.8% in share of the total 
amount of investment in 2003; even this is an improvement compared to 2002. Expansion 
stage investments dropped from €53.7 million (45.6% of total amount of investment) in 2002 
down to €40.4 million (30.3% of total amount of investment) in 2003 (Fig. 27). 
(3) Concerning the number of investments, 2 investments (3.2% of total number of invest-
ments) were completed in 2003 compared to none in 2002. This indicates, referring to the 
amount of investment of €15.1 million in 2003, that the transactions were of a high value. The 
number of investments in the start-up stage decreased from 15 (4.3% of total number of in-
vestments) in 2002 to 6 (9.5% of total number of investments) in 2003. Therefore, the number 
of early stage investments dropped from 14.7% of the total number of investments in 2002 to 
12.7% in 2003. The number of investments in expansion stage fell from 60 (59.3% of total 
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Source:   EVCA 2004 
(4) Poland adopted a new policy for the capital market of the country called “Agenda Warsaw 
City 2010”. Its aim is to build the strongest capital market in Central and Eastern Europe by 
the year 2010. The policy implies to raise the capitalisation of the country’s equity market to 
at least 50% (2003: 21%) of the GDP. Furthermore, the policy aims to increase the share of 
the venture capital market from 0.06% of the GDP up to 0.25% of the GDP in 2010. For the 
Polish government the development of the venture capital market plays an important role for 
the economic growth and the innovation of the country’s economy. 
Other measures for the growth of the country’s economy are the capital absorption of the gov-
ernment for funds from national financial institutions, like pension funds and insurance firms, 
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5.2.4  Austria 
(1) With €164 million in 2003 compared with €177 million in 2002, a slight downturn in 
raised funds can be noted. The indicator “funds raised per capita” shows only little changes 
(Fig. 28). 










Source:   EVCA 2003, EVCA 2004, OECD 2004 
(2) The Austrian private equity market as well as the venture capital market are relatively 
small compared to other European countries. The total amount of investment in private equity 
decreased from €146 million in 2002 to €113 million in 2003. This essential downswing is 
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Source:   EVCA 2003, EVCA 2004, OECD 2004 
(3) The amount of investment for seed stage capital was at €5.2 million or a share of 3.5% of 
its annual total amount of investment in 2002. In 2003, the seed stage completely failed to 
attract funds, there was not one investment in that phase. The start-up stage attracted more 
funds than the year before (2002: €22.3 million) and received €30 million in 2003, which is 
with its 26.2% of the total amount of investment in start-ups a big rise in share as well. In 
2003, the expansion stage noted with 62.8% of the total amount of investment in 2003, com-
pared with 60.4% in 2002, an increase in investment. However, the absolute amount of in-
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Source:   EVCA 2004 
(4) The number of investments in the seed stage phase dropped from 34 in 2002 (3.5% total 
number of investments) to none in 2003. Start-up investments fell, despite an increase in the 
amount of investments, from 40 (23.6% total number of investments) in 2002 down to 26 
(17.9% total number of investments) in 2003. This means that early stage investments in 
terms of share of the total number decreased from 18.8% in 2002 to 17.9% in 2003, which is 
an overall trend in the countries in this survey. The number of expansion stage investments 
jumped from 77 in 2002 up to 105 in 2003. They represent almost three quarters of the entire 
number of investments in the year 2003 (Fig. 30). 
Austria has implemented changes in the legal and fiscal environment. Changes in tax rules 
should support the economic growth of the country’s economy. Tax incentives are examples 
which include premiums for new investments in fixed assets and qualifying research and de-
velopment activities. Proposals for the tax reform in the year 2005 are, for instance, the reduc-
tion of corporate income tax to 25% and a group taxation model including a foreign loss-relief 
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5.2.5  Germany 
(1) Capital raised by private equity and venture capital companies decreased from €1.6 billion 
in 2002 to €1.2 billion in 2003 which can be clearly seen in the indicator “funds raised per 
capita - Germany” (Fig. 31). 










Source:   EVCA 2003, EVCA 2004, OECD 2004 
The German, alongside the European, private equity and venture capital market consolidated 
in the year 2003 (GoingPublic Magazin 2004). The total amount of investment decreased 
slightly from €2.5 billion in 2002 to €2.48 billion in 2003 which is however not very notice-
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Source:   EVCA 2003, EVCA 2004, OECD 2004 
(2) Early stage investments dropped extremely from €560 million and a 22.4% share of the 
total amount invested in 2002 to €292 million and a 11.8% in share in 2003. Seed stage in-
vestments of €77 million (3.1% of total amount of investment) in 2002 fell to a third with €27 
million (1.1% of total amount of investment) in 2003 (BVK 2003, BVK 2004). Start-up stage 
investments of €484 million (19.3% of total amount of investment) in 2002 fell to €265 mil-
lion (10.7% of total amount of investment) in 2003. Expansion stage investments also tum-
bled from €783 million (31.2% of total amount of investment) in 2002 down to €411 million 
(16.6% of total amount of investment) in 2003. However, buyout investments increased from 
€1,1 billion (45.7% of total amount of investment) in 2002 up to €1.8 billion (71.5% of total 
amount of investment) in 2003. 
(3) Concerning the number of investments a downswing can be noted as well. From 1720 
investments in 2002, the number of investments decreased down to 1214 in 2003. Early stage 
investments in absolute number fell from 734 in 2002 to 518 in 2003 (BVK 2003, BVK 
2004).  At  the  same  time,  share  of  the  total  number  of  investments  stayed  the  same  with 
42.7%. Within the early stage, seed stage investments dropped from 95 (5.5% of the total 
number of investments) in 2002 to 35 (2.9% of the total number of investments) in 2003; 
start-up stage investments decreased from 639 in 2002 down to 483 in 2003. Expansion stage 
investment dropped as well compared with the year before (2002: 894 investments, 2003: 624 
investments). Comparing investments in the buyout stage there was a decrease from 82 in-
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Source:   EVCA 2004 
The total number of investments as well as the total amount of investments slightly decreased 
in 2003 compared to the 2002 statistics. Only the buyout investment sector increased whereas 
early stage investments decreased by number and amount. One reason for acting cautious on 
the side of institutional investors was the uncertain tax environment in Germany. The uncer-
tainty ended in December 2003, when the Ministry of Finance published a decree concerning 
the taxation of private equity funds and past carried interests. Unfortunately, the decree, the 
Tax Reduction Benefit Act, brought disadvantages for private equity companies and portfolio 
companies. These disadvantages were mainly thin-capitalisation rules, silent partnerships and 
the restriction of loss carry forwards (GoingPublic Magazin 2004). 
(4) The German Government, together with the European Investment Fund, decided to launch 
a venture capital fund at the end of 2003, starting operations in the middle of 2004 with a fo-
cus on early stage investments. Private investors shall be encouraged by this fund to invest 
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5.3  Equity Financing of the Future 
(1) The year 2003, which from an economic point of view was quite successful in terms of the 
amount of investment for many countries in the European Union, was not successful for all 
countries discussed in this survey. While the United Kingdom is outstanding regarding the 
amount of private equity investment and Poland shows an increase in private equity invest-
ments, decreasing amounts of investment for the other countries considered are to be noted for 
2003. 
(2) Concerning the investment behaviour of the analysed countries, big differences are to be 
noticed in terms of funds raised per capita and investments per capita. While these indicators 
are rising remarkably in the United Kingdom, they remain static or decrease in these catego-
ries in other countries. Furthermore, it has been shown in chapter 3 and 4 that particularly the 
UK has a different financial system in regard to private equity than most continental European 
states. The reason for the differences can be divided into four factors. 
First of all, the UK retirement system (A) is based on capital markets in contrast to the con-
tinental European pay as you go pension system. Pension funds in the UK are main drivers to 
raise private equity. The following table shows the various schemes for Germany and the UK.  
Table 10:  Key figures of national Private Equity markets 
  Germany  UK 
  1999  2001  2003  1999  2001  2003 
Portfolio at cost (€bn)  7.9  15.8  16.2  28.0  39.8  51.9 
New funds raised (€bn)  3.8  3.7  1.2  9.9  20.5  15.0 
Stage  distribution  of 
investments (in %)*
  
-  early stage 
-  expansion 
-  Replace-
ment/buyout 











































Sources:  EVCA Yearbooks 2000, 2002 and 2004 
Capital market based retirement systems may invest solely in risk-reduced asset. It is, there-
fore, quite plausible that a large share of the investments is in company buyouts. Buyouts Access to Finance and Venture  
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usually take place in mature companies where the risk of the investment can more easily be 
calculated. 
(3) Second, the financing culture (B) in the UK has always been different from continental 
Europe. SMEs in the UK have always shown a higher acceptance of the influence on man-
agement by private equity providers. Furthermore, as has been shown in chapter 3.2., the het-
erogeneity of financial instrument used by SMEs has always been larger. 
(4) As a third factor, the variety in accounting standards (C) provide for differences in the 
calculation of equity. UK-GAAP leads to a higher equity share than the national accounting 
standards in continental Europe. As has been show by BDI (2003), the differences among the 
accounting standards are at least partly responsible for the equity gap. However, in contrast to 
the factors A and B, differences in the accounting standards do not influence the availability 
and the cost of private equity. 
(5) Finally, the opportunity cost for equity (D) in the UK seems to be lower than in conti-
nental Europe. From economic theory we know that under a perfect competition equilibrium 
returns on equity investments are the same as the cost of debt-financing. In reality various 
effects change the prices for equity and debt-financing. The effects are: 
(a) tax influences, 
(b) risk allocated to equity and debt financing, 
(c) business cycles, and 
(d) market structure of the financial market. 
By the reduction of the tax base, debt-financing is always tax-privileged compared to equity-
financing (for details see chapter 5.2.5). Furthermore, the risk associated with equity financ-
ing, from an investor’s perspective, is always higher than debt-financing. This goes along 
with the third effect that results from business cycles: The higher the growth rate of an econ-
omy, the less risky capital investments are in general. Accordingly, low or negative growth 
rates lead to higher capital cost than high growth rates. Finally, the cost of capital also de-
pends on the structure of the finance market. The higher the market is concentrated, the 
easier it is for debt-financing investors to realise higher interest rates. The effects are shown in 
the following graph. Access to Finance and Venture  
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Source:   Own production 
(6) Effect (b) risk allocation leads to higher cost of equity compared to debt-financing. From 
the investor’s point of view, investing in a not risk-limited corporation (e.g. partnership) may 
result – in the case of company default – in a total loss of the invested capital plus additional 
private capital. Investing in a risk-limited corporation (e.g. Ltd.) can lead to a maximum loss 
of the investment sum. Giving the capital as debt to the SME, allows the possibility of achiev-
ing at least the dividend in bankruptcy in case of a company default. Accordingly, the equity 
capital cost increase with the risk allocated to the business. Costs of debt-financing are less 
influenced by this effect. That effect will be enhanced by the regulations initiated under the 
Basel II agreement. Here capital investors have to provide a higher risk margin for equity in-
vestments. 
(7) Effect (c) is closely related to the various growth rates of economies. In the last ten years, 
the UK has shown higher rates than continental European economies. Accordingly, the ex-
pected risk of default associated with an investment is lower in the UK. This results in re-
duced expected equity cost in the UK compared to the other countries considered, where the 
low or negative growth rates lead to higher equity cost. 
(8) The more concentrated the market for debt-financing is (d), the easier banks can set higher 
interest rates. Since 88 % of all debt-financing to UK SMEs is provided by only five British 











A  =  Financing of retirements
B  =  Cultural aspects
D  =  Opportunity cost of capital
a  =  Tax effect
b  =  Risk effect
c  =  Effect of economic growth
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and Germany (Competition Commission, 2002). We thus can state that debt-financing cost is 
cheaper for SMEs in continental Europe than it is in the UK. That is also proven by various 
banking reports (cf. e.g. Cruickshank, 2000). 
(9) The tax effect (a) needs further analysis and will be the focus of the following chapter. 
 
6  Impact Analysis of the Tax Framework and the Accounting Standards 
on Financing Innovations 
6.1  Tax rules Relevant for SMEs’ Access to Finance 
(1) The importance of the tax environment for SMEs’ access to finance is quite obvious as 
e.g. 73% of Europe’s private equity houses estimate tax as a key value driver on private eq-
uity (see Fig. 35).  








Source:  PwC 2004b 
(2) SMEs´ access to finance is influenced by two levels of taxation: First, SMEs’ capability of 
self-financing by equity and debt-financing is affected by the tax system. Second, venture 
capital companies – the possible capital providers of new SMEs – are impeded or supported 
by tax regulations. There are strong differences among the tax system in Europe concerning 
both levels. Therefore, the following analysis of the tax framework and the accounting stan-
dards on financing innovations is divided into two parts, answering two different questions: Access to Finance and Venture  
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Question 1:   How  do  tax  systems  affect  innovative  SMEs’  capability  to  finance 
themselves by accumulating profits or by debt-financing? 
Question 2:   How can venture capital companies be supported by tax incentives? 
Question 1 will be discussed in Chapter 6.2.: Tax Situation of SMEs. Accordingly, chapter 
6.3.: Taxation of Venture Capital Companies contains the discussion of Question 2. 
6.2  Tax Situation of SMEs 
6.2.1  Financing SMEs 
(1) As a general and well-know effect, from the company’s point of view, debt-financing is 
less tax-intensive as self-financing by accumulating profits. This is due to two reasons, which 
are the so-called leverage effect and the tax shield. 
(2) In all tax systems, interest paid by a company on loans or other debts is generally deducti-
ble from the tax base. Accordingly, the interest payment to a bank or other credit institute 
reduces the company’s tax burden. If the corporation’s profitability on the debt capital ex-
ceeds the contracted interest rate, a profit remains at the company’s level (leverage effect). 
This profit is taxed at the company’s level – but after deduction of interest paid (tax shield). 
As the creditor has to pay tax on the interest he received, the total amount of tax is split up 
between creditor and debtor. From the point of view of a debt-financed company, debt capital 
is therefore “cheaper” than equity. 
Example: A company needs additional capital of €100,000 for a new project. The rate of re-
turn will be 12%, so that a profit of €12,000 before interest and tax (PBIT) will be achieved. If 
the needed capital is provided as equity (by a shareholder or a venture capital company), the 
company has to pay taxes on the profit. With an assumed tax rate of 25%, €3,000 have to be 
paid to the fiscal authorities. So far, the cost of equity capital is €3,000 / €100,000 = 3%. Al-
ternatively, if the needed capital is granted as a loan on 10% interest rate, the profit is reduced 
to €2,000 (= €100,000 * (12% - 10%)). Accordingly, tax is reduced to 25% * €2,000 = €500. 
For this alternative, the total cost of debt capital is (€10,000 + €500) / €100,000 = 10.5%. But, 
calculated in relation to the PBIT of €12,000, the company has to pay €3,000 taxes (25%) in 
the equity-financing case compared to €500 (4.17%) tax in the debt-financing case. Caused by 
this skewed view, debt-financing seems to be “tax privileged” and so far cheaper for the com-
pany. The fiscal authorities are generally indifferent to both cases, if – and only if – the credi-
tor is subject to the same tax rate as the debtor: As the creditor achieves investment income of 
€10,000 taxed with 25%, the “missing” €2,500 will be paid by him. 
(3) Structuring the growth-process of new companies, the taxation of profit will not be a prob-
lem of their first years. As innovation needs research and development, the first period of a 
young company’s life will be characterised by high R&D expenditure leading to losses over Access to Finance and Venture  
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several years. One possibility to give such companies a tax advantage can be to allow the rec-
ognition of self-developed intangible assets. But, as there usually is no market price for self-
developed innovations, it is almost impossible to define a fair value for tax purposes. For the 
purpose of tax safety and for avoiding tax planning by recognition and valuation of intangi-
bles, most countries have decided to exclude the amortisation of R&D expenditures for self-
developed intangible assets (e.g. German Income Tax Law). 
(4) Another possibility to improve the tax situation of SMEs with high R&D expenditure af-
fects the treatment of losses: If the young company generates losses in its starting period, at 
least a non-limited loss carry-forward should be granted. Another possibility can be the loss 
carry-back, which is positive only for older companies that produced gains in previous peri-
ods. Undisputedly, the loss carry-back leads to immediate financial and liquidity effects for 
the mentioned companies. But for new companies, other ideas are needed.  
6.2.2  Treatment of Losses 
In the following, the general considerations will be discussed for the selected countries. To 
give the following discussion an informational basis, first the loss-treatment regulations of 
Austria, France, Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom are described. That will be fol-
lowed by a discussion about self financing by profit accumulation. Finally debt financing 
regulations are analysed.  
Austria 
Corporations 
Losses incurred in Austria may be carried forward indefinitely. A carry-back of losses is not 
permitted. Only the taxpayer who incurs a loss may claim it as a deduction. There are some 
exceptions in the case of mergers, divisions, etc. Losses incurred in the current or a previous 
tax year can only be set of against 75% of the income of the current year. Excess losses may 
be carried forward to the following tax year. 
Individuals 
In general, the carry-forward of losses is the same for individuals as for companies. As a rule, 
losses must first be set off against income from the same category and then against all other 
categories of income. In principle, only taxpayers who determine their profits according to the 
net-worth comparison method qualify for a loss carry-forward. However, taxpayers who de-
termine their business income according to the net-income method (SMEs) may also carry 
forward start-up losses arising in the first three assessment periods.  
Note: Losses incurred by an individual from a business, consisting mainly of the management 
of intangible assets or leasing activities, may not be set off against income from any other 
source. Such losses may be set off against future profits of the same business. Access to Finance and Venture  
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From 1 January 2004, losses may be carried forward indefinitely (previously a five-year limi-
tation existed). Corporate taxpayers have the option, with certain limitations, to carry losses 
back for three years. In that case they are entitled to a tax credit, not a refund. The tax credit 
may be used during the following five years and will be refundable in the sixth year. 
Note: Start-up costs may either be deducted as operating expenses or depreciated over a five-
year period. Additionally it should be mentioned that from 1 January 2004, a tax credit for 
research and development expenditure is available. The credit is calculated by two compo-
nents: 
•  a first component, which takes into account the volume of expenditure, amounts 
to 5% of all the expenses related to operations of research and development; and 
•  a second component, which takes into account the annual increase in the expendi-
ture, equals 45% of the difference between (a) R&D expenditure during the year 
and (b) the average of R&D expenditure during the preceding two years as ad-
justed by a coefficient based on the consumer index.  
The total tax credit may not exceed €8 million. Negative tax credits in one year may be car-
ried forward for a maximum of five years. 
Individuals 
A loss in one category may normally be set off against income of another category. Excess 
loss which cannot be set off against the income of a given year may be carried forward for six 
years. The carry-forward of losses attributed to income from immovable property and capital 
losses from the disposal of immovable property is restricted. 
Germany 
Corporations 
In general, losses up to €511,500 may be carried back to the preceding year. From tax year 
2004 onwards, any excess losses may only be carried forward to be set of against the first 
€1 million of net income in a given year without restriction. Any remaining loss may be set 
off against up to 60% of the net income exceeding this limit. Upon request, the company may 
carry losses forward without having carried them back. Access to Finance and Venture  
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Individuals 
In general, the same rules apply for individuals as for companies. Losses may generally be 
fully set off against income arising in the same tax year. The set-off of certain losses may ei-
ther be allowed or limited. 
Poland 
Losses may be carried forward for five years; up to 50% of the loss may be set off in each 




Trading losses may be carried back for one year and forward indefinitely in the same and con-
tinuing trade, provided that the company remains within the charge to corporation tax. Any 
loss carried forward is set off against the earliest available trading profits. Alternatively, a 
trading loss may be set off against other income of the same or preceding accounting year and 
against capital gains of the same year. Any other non-trading income losses cannot be set off 
against trading profits. Such losses can only be carried forward and set off against the same 
class of income or capital gains. 
Notice: For research and development, an immediate write-off of the expenditure is allowed. 
For SMEs, there is a special regime, increasing the relief on R&D expenditure up to 150%, 
subject to certain limitations, most importantly a required minimum spending of GBP 10,000. 
If the additional deduction creates a loss, this may be carried forward, surrendered by way of 
group relief or surrendered in exchange for a cash repayment at 16% of the surrendered loss. 
Individuals 
Trade losses may be set off against other income of the current or preceding year, or carried 
forward indefinitely in the same and continuing trade; they may also be set off against capital 
gains of the current  year only. Pre-trading expenditure incurred in the seven years before 
commencement of trading is deductible on the commencement of trading. Losses of the first 
four assessment years of trading can be set off against income of the three assessment years 
preceding trading, taking the earlier year first. Access to Finance and Venture  
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General conclusion 
Table 11:  Summary of loss treatment 




-.-  3 years  1 year, € 
511,500 






Indefinitely  Indefinitely; 
Minimum 
taxation 







-.-  -.-  1 year, € 
511,500 













Source:   Own production 
As has been shown, the carry-back of losses is not as important as the carry-forward, because 
young companies often have no preceding years with profits. A tax system should thus not 
limit the loss carry-forward in any way, at least not for amounts typical for SMEs (see 
France (only for corporations) and the United Kingdom, where losses can be carried forward 
indefinitely).  
A minimum taxation (see Austria, Germany and Poland) is negative for all business sizes, as 
it leads to companies paying taxes without having generated an over-all profit: A company 
just getting out of losses has to pay taxes on profit derived in the first positive years, not re-
garding that there may be no positive total output yet (e.g. Austria, where losses incurred in 
the current or a previous tax year can only be set off against 75% of the income of the current 
year). If a country needs a minimum tax for fiscal purposes, it at least should introduce a regu-
lation for SMEs (e.g. Germany, where losses can be set off against the first €1 million of net 
income in a given year without restriction.Thus, SMEs usually will not be subject to the re-
striction  of  setting  off  remaining  losses  against  up  to  60%  of  the  net  income  exceeding 
€1,000,000.).  Access to Finance and Venture  
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The two British regulations for pre-trading expenditure and losses are very useful instruments 
for start-ups: (1) Pre-trading expenditure incurred in the seven years before commencement 
of trading is deductible on the commencement of trading. So expenditures for business pur-
poses will not get lost for tax purposes. (2) Losses of the first four assessment years of 
trading can be set off against income of the three assessment years preceding trading. By 
carrying back losses to periods with income generated by other sources, e.g. employment in-
come, the start-up partnership gets additional equity out of taxes paid by the partners in previ-
ous years. 
6.2.3  Treatment of Self-financing by Profit Accumulation 
As SMEs grow, they may achieve profits and will have an increasing need for new financial 
resources. In general, they have three possibilities: (1) Self-financing by accumulating profits; 
(2) New equity capital – either from shareholders or from third parties, e.g. venture capital 
companies; and (3) Debt-financing – again either from shareholders or from banks or other 
credit institutes. 
To compare these three alternatives, an overview about national tax systems is needed. The 
total amount of tax burden is determined by three aspects: To describe the taxation of business 
activities information is needed about  
•  the tax system,  
•  the tax rates, and  
•  the taxable income. 
The tax system is defined by the relation between corporate income tax and personal income 
tax. To mitigate double taxation on dividends at the company’s and at the shareholder’s level, 
the corporate income tax is more or less integrated into the personal income tax of the indi-
vidual shareholder.  
There are various types of tax systems in Europe. Three main categories can be distinguished: 
The classical system results in the double taxation of dividends by imposing both corporate 
and personal income tax. By contrast, double taxation avoiding systems make sure that profits 
are taxed only once, which can be at the corporate level or at the shareholder level. For fiscal 
and economic-political reasons, most countries implement double taxation reducing systems: 
In shareholder relief systems the shareholders receive – compared to other sources of personal 
income – preferential treatments for their dividend income. As an alternative, the corporate 
income tax can partly be imputed on the personal income tax (see Fig. 36). Access to Finance and Venture  
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Source:  Ernst & Young/ZEW 2004 
Note:  As from 2005, Finland and France switched to shareholder relief systems. 
Tax rates contain information about the nominal (statutory) tax burden for individuals and 
companies. Dependent upon the number of taxes a country levies on business activity and 
upon possible connections between those taxes, a first overview can be given on tax charges 
companies have to cope with. Additionally, the complexity of the tax system can be esti-
mated, which plays at least a psychological role in SMEs’ planning procedures. 
But, as Fig. 37 shows, nominal tax rates give a biased view of companies’ tax burden. Includ-
ing the differences between the countries in defining the tax base may increase or decrease the 
effective tax burden; but in all countries nominal and effective rates differ. Access to Finance and Venture  
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Source:  Bundesministerium für Finanzen 2004, ZEW 2002, 2004 
Taxation is the product of the tax rate multiplied by the tax base.So the definition of taxable 
income is needed to calculate the effective tax burden. Effective tax burdens take into ac-
count the most important taxes on corporate income that are relevant for profitable invest-
ments, considering the statutory rates of these taxes as well as the most important rules for the 
definition of the tax base, e.g. differences in depreciation allowances. Additionally, they in-
clude taxes on capital or payroll, so the effective tax burden can cover all payments to fiscal 
authorities in the described country. 
The aim of a study about SMEs’ access to capital is not to describe all parts of taxation in the 
considered countries.
6 The following chapter will concentrate on those aspects of taxation that 
appear to be obstacles for SMEs' access to equity as well as debt capital. It will be differenti-
ated between the possible legal forms of SMEs that are held by individual shareholders. 
                                                 
6 The descriptive parts of the following analysis are written with regard to the European Tax Handbook 2004, 
published by the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Amsterdam. 


























Aggregated nominal tax rates for corporations (2004)
Effective average tax burden for distributing corporations (Eastern Europe and Germany: 2004; Western Europe: 2003 if no other year mentioned)Access to Finance and Venture  
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Relevant cases for SMEs 
Before describing the tax systems of the five countries under scrutiny, further specifications 
have to be made: In most countries the taxation of business profits depends on the legal form 
the business is conducted in. Companies can be legal entities (corporations, e.g. stock compa-
nies, limited liability companies), partnerships (limited or general) or sole proprietorships. 
Accordingly, they can be held by different shareholders (corporations, partnerships or indi-
viduals). Out of this 3x3-matrix three cases seem to be more relevant for SMEs (venture capi-
tal companies as shareholders of SMEs will be analysed separately): 
Table 12:  Company-shareholder-structure of SMEs 
Shareholder 
Company 
Corporation  Partnership  Individual 
Corporation      Case (1) 
Partnership      Case (2) 
Sole Proprietorship      Case (3) 
  black:     non-existing 
green:    less relevant for SMEs 
  yellow:    relevant for SMEs 
Source:  Own production 
The following discussion focuses on corporations, partnerships and sole proprietorships 
held by individuals only. Group taxation including group relief will not be dealt with. Ac-
cording to the historical development and the company law of each country, certain company 
types may be more important for a country’s SMEs than others.
7 
The kind of capital a company is financed with, directly determines the amount to be paid for 
income taxes and related business taxes. Non-income taxes, such as payroll taxes (including 
social  security  contributions,  which  may  be  constructed  as  “social  taxes”)  and  real  estate 
taxes, are not directly linked to a company’s debt-equity ratio. But as those taxes, on the one 
hand, increase the total tax burden of that company, they are on the other usually deductible 
for income and business tax purposes. To pinpoint this effect, the following descriptions of 
                                                 
7 In Germany, e.g., almost 71 % of all companies with a revenue of EUR 50,000,000 or take the legal form of 
sole proprietorship. 15.17 % are corporations, and only 12.20 % are partnerships (Source: destatis). Similar re-
lations are given in Austria and Poland. Structures in France and the United Kingdom differ, where a higher 
share of SMEs are conducted as corporations. Access to Finance and Venture  
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countries’ tax systems contain income and non-income related taxes and calculate after-
income-tax burdens of non-income related taxes, too. 
Austria 
Case (1): Corporations held by individuals 
Corporate profits are subject to corporate income tax. From 1 January 2005, the tax rate 
amounts to 25% (previously 34%). An annual minimum tax of € 3,500 for stock companies 
and € 1,750 for limited liability companies is levied. Adjustments are provided for banks and 
insurance companies. The minimum tax is due in advance and can be set off against the final 
corporate income tax. There are no other taxes on income. 
The Austrian taxation follows the shareholder relief system. Dividends and other profit dis-
tributions to resident individual shareholders are subject to a final withholding tax of 25%. 
This also applies if the income is derived in the course of a trade or a business. The taxpayer 
has the choice of taxation with one half of the effective tax rate on his total income if this is 
more favourable. This regime applies if requested by the taxpayer within five years of its 
prevalence. Dividends derived by individuals owning newly issued shares in resident private-
owned companies that are engaged in production activities, are subject neither to withholding 
tax nor to individual income tax to the extent that the dividends are attributable to those 
shares. 
Additionally, taxpayers may elect to deduct fictitious interest in the increase of their equity 
capital. The increase in equity capital is determined by comparing the average equity capital 
of the tax year to the highest average equity capital of the seven previous tax years.
8 The in-
terest rate to be used is the average rate on the secondary market, increased by 0.8 percentage 
points (2004: 5.5%). Fictitious interest payments are subject to tax at 25% as “special profit” 
at the business level. At the level of the investor they are not treated as investment income. 
The ordinary profit after deduction of the fictitious interest is subject to tax at the standard 
rate. 
There are no other taxes on income. Municipalities receive a payroll tax of 3% on the aggre-
gate salaries paid to the employees. A person is considered to be an employee if he derives his 
income either from dependent work or certain forms of independent work. Small enterprises 
with an assessment base of € 1,460 per month or less and a single permanent establishment 
may claim an allowance of € 1,095 per year. The municipal tax is deductible for corporate 
income tax purposes. Additionally, every employer must make contributions to the Family 
Burden Equalization Fund at a rate of 4.5% on the aggregate amount of the salaries. 
Employers must also pay social security contributions for all employees whose place of 
work  is  Austria.  Contributions  of  21.65%  (white-collar  workers)  or  21.85%  (blue-collar 
workers, each 2004) are levied on an employee’s annual remuneration up to € 41,400. A sepa-
                                                 
8 Tax years ending before 1 January 1998 are not taken into account. Access to Finance and Venture  
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rate ceiling of € 6,900 applies for special remuneration such as the 13
th or 14
th month’s salary. 
The employer’s contribution to the employee pension and severance payments fund is cur-
rently  1.83%.  For  certain  blue-collar  workers,  employers  must  make  an  additional  night 
shift/heavy work contribution of 2% and a bad weather contribution of 0.7%. Social security 
contributions paid by employers are deductible for corporate income tax purposes. 
In Austria, there is no general net worth tax, but immovable property situated in Austria is 
subject to real estate tax. The tax is levied in the assessed standard rateable value of immov-
able property, whether developed or not. In general, the assessed value is substantially lower 
than the market value. The real estate tax is levied at a basic federal rate of usually 0.2%, mul-
tiplied by a municipal coefficient that ranges up to 500%. Real estate tax paid is deductible for 
corporate income tax purposes. 
The total tax burden consists of the taxation of corporate income, of additional taxes on sala-
ries and real estate and of social security contributions. As the last positions lower the tax base 
for income tax purposes, their effective rate is lower than the nominal percentages. Yet it has 
to be mentioned that payroll taxes, real estate taxes and social security contributions even 
have to be paid in periods of corporate losses. 
In the case of profit accumulation the income tax burden equals 25%. In the case of distribu-
tion to an individual shareholder the profit is normally charged with a total nominal tax of 
25% + 0.75 * 25% = 43.75%. If the taxpayer chooses the alternative treatment, the total can 
vary between 25% + 0,75 * 0% * ½ = 25% and 25% + 0,75 * 50% * ½  = 43.75%. For tax-
payers electing to deduct profits as fictitious interest or deriving dividends out of newly issued 
shares the total tax burden equals 25%. 
The tax burden is enlarged by the above mentioned payroll taxes of 7.5% and the social secu-
rity contributions varying between 23.48% and 26.38%. As both are deductable from the in-
come tax base, the sum is reduced by the income tax effect. According to the distribution pol-
icy of the corporation the total burden of payroll taxes and social security contributions 
can vary between (7.5% + 23.48%) * (1 – 0.4375) = 17.43%
9 and (7.5% + 26.38%) * (1 – 
0.25) = 25.41%
10 of salaries paid in one period. 
The maximum nominal real estate burden equals 0.2% * 500% = 0.01%. Including the in-
come tax effect, the effective real estate tax burden can reach 0.01% * (1 – 0.25) = 0.0075% 
per annum on the assessed standard rateable value of the company’s immovable property. 
Case (2): Partnerships held by individuals 
Both general and limited partnerships are treated as transparent entities for tax purposes, i.e. 
the partners are taxed individually on their share of the profits. Resident individuals are sub-
                                                 
9 For salaries paid to white-collar employees, reducing the tax paid on distributed profits. 
10 Relevant for salaries paid to blue-collar employees for night shift or heavy work and bad weather compensa-
tion, reducing the tax paid on accumulated profits or on profits deducted as fictitious interest. Access to Finance and Venture  
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ject  to  national  income  tax  with  their  worldwide  income,  whether  received  in  money  or 
money’s worth. Income tax is computed on the aggregate net income of all categories of in-
come. The rates for 2005 are as follows:  
Table 13:  Income tax rates in Austria 
Taxable income (€)  Tax 
up to 10,000     0% 
10,000 – 25,000     23% on excess over 10,000 € 
25,000 – 51,000     5,750  €  
+ 33,5% on excess over 25,000 € 
over 51,000     17,085  €  
+ 50% on excess over 51,000 € 
Source:  Sec. 33 par. 1 Austrian Income Tax Law 
For individuals deriving business income, reinvested profits up to € 100,000 are subject to a 
reduced income tax rate that equals one half of the average income tax calculated on annual 
income. Profits withdrawn in subsequent tax years are recaptured and taxed at the normal 
progressive rates. Municipalities receive a share of the national individual income tax. 
The above-mentioned regulations concerning payroll taxes and social security contributions 
affect partnerships accordingly. As for income tax on business income the use of the com-
pany’s profits is generally of no importance. There does not exist a differentiation between 
profit accumulation and distribution. Caused by the income tax effect the total burden of 
payroll taxes and social security contributions varies between (7.5% + 23.48%) * (1 – 0.5) 
= 15.49%
11 and (7.5% + 26.38%) * (1 – 0) = 33.88%
12 of salaries paid in one period.  
Regulations for real estate tax are the same as those mentioned for corporations. Subject to the 
taxation of the partnerships, the effective tax burden on real estate can have a maximum of 
0.01% * (1 – 0) = 0.01%. 
Case (3): Sole proprietorships 
Business income is taxed under the category “trade and business” and is generally defined 
as the difference between the value of the enterprise’s assets at the end of a financial year and 
                                                 
11 For salaries paid to white-collar employees, reducing income taxed at a rate of 50 %. 
12 Relevant for salaries paid to blue-collar employees for night shift or heavy work and bad weather compensa-
tion, reducing income taxed at a rate of 0 %. Access to Finance and Venture  
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the value of those assets at the end of the preceding financial year, plus withdrawals and mi-
nus contributions to the capital of a business during the course of the year. Usually, it must be 
computed on the basis of a profit and loss account. Small enterprises, however, are exempt 
from the obligation to keep books. They may compute profits as the surplus of business in-
come over business expenses. Taxpayers calculating their income on a cash basis may opt 
for a lump-sum deduction of expenses instead of deducting actual expenses. For business 
activities, the deduction in general is calculated as 6% of gross income, so that the remaining 
94% have to be taxed. 
The above-mentioned general and reduced income tax rates apply accordingly to the business 
income of individuals doing their business in the legal form of a sole proprietorship. There are 
no special rules concerning payroll tax, social security contributions and real estate tax. 
France 
Case (1): Corporations held by individuals 
Corporate taxpayers are subject to corporate income tax on their French-source business 
income and on their worldwide passive investment income. Liability to corporate tax may be 
either mandatory or optional: Corporations, simplified stock companies, limited liability com-
panies and partnerships limited by shares are subject to mandatory corporate tax liability. 
Moreover, corporate tax has to be paid on profits of limited partners in partnerships. General 
partnerships, limited partnerships (for the general partners’ part of the profit), single member 
limited liability companies, civil companies and joint ventures may opt for the corporate tax 
liability. Otherwise they are treated as transparent entities for tax purposes. The standard cor-
porate income tax rate is 33.3%. It is increased by a 3% surcharge, resulting in an effective 
rate of 34.3%. 
Small and medium sized enterprises are subject to corporate income tax at a reduced rate of 
15% on the first €38,120 of profits and at the standard rate on any excess. The reduced rate is 
increased by the 3% surcharge to 15.45%. In contrast to the definition by the European Com-
mission, SMEs in France are defined as owned with at least 75% by individuals and with a 
turnover of €7,630,000 or less. 
Large companies are subject to an additional social surcharge of 3.3% levied on that part of 
aggregate corporate tax, calculated at the standard rate and at the reduced rate on long-term 
capital gains, which exceeds €763,000. The resulting effective rate on that part is 35.43%. 
Large companies are assumed to be companies whose turnover exceeds €7,630,000. 
A reduced rate of 19% applies to long-term capital gains and royalties. It is increased by the 
3% surcharge, resulting in an effective rate of 19.57%. For large companies, the 19% rate is 
subject to the 3.3% social surcharge (effective rate: 20.20%). Long-term capital gains are e.g. 
gains on units and shares held for at least five years in qualifying venture capital funds or 
companies. Access to Finance and Venture  
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There are several tax rate incentives for newly created companies and/or innovative compa-
nies: Full and partial exemptions are granted to companies created prior to 31 December 
2009. A full corporate income tax exemption is granted for the initial 24 months. It is reduced 
to 75%, 50% and 25% for each of the following 12-month periods, respectively. This 36-
month reduction is limited to the part of profits that does not exceed €225,000. To qualify for 
the relief, certain conditions concerning the type and location of the activity must be satisfied. 
Eligibility can be determined by an advance ruling. 
A special regime for innovative new companies applies to SMEs, at least 50% of which are 
owned by individuals. This regime grants a complete corporate income tax exemption in the 
initial three years of the innovative activity, reduced to 50% in the following two years. Addi-
tionally, exemptions from various other taxes, e.g. business tax and social security contribu-
tions, are granted. To qualify for the regime, a company must have existed for less than eight 
years and must carry out innovative activities with at least 15% of its total expenditure. 
The French tax system has been substantially modified by the Finance Law 2004, which 
abolished  the  imputation  system,  the  connected  imputation  credit  (“avoir  fiscal”)  and  the 
equalization tax (“précompte mobilier”) with effect from 1 January 2005. As a transitional 
measure, a one-off tax on distributions made in 2005 out of untaxed profits, applies. One third 
of this tax is creditable against the corporate income tax of the distributing company for each 
of the three following years. The one-off tax is not payable by SMEs on the part of their low-
taxed profits.  
From 1 January 2005, a shareholder relief system applies, i.e. only 50% of the dividends 
received will be subject to tax (a so-called “half-income system”). In addition, resident indi-
viduals benefit from a tax-free allowance (€1,220; double for couples) and a modest tax credit 
(€115; double for couples) regarding the dividends. In France, current income tax rates are 
usually given on a year-by-year basis, each retroactive for the previous year. For 2004’s as-
sessment of 2003 income, the progressive income tax rates are: Access to Finance and Venture  





Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 97  72 
 
Table 14:  Income tax rates in France 
Taxable income (€)  Tax on total taxable income 
up to       4,262  0% 
  4,262 – 8,382  6.83% 
  8,382 – 14,753  19.14% 
14,753 – 23,888  28.26% 
23,888 – 38,686  37.38% 
38,686 – 47,932  42,62% 
over        47,932  48.09% 
Source:  IBFD 2004 
It should be mentioned that income tax in France is levied on the families’ level with a coeffi-
cient system mitigating the progression of the income tax structure for taxpayers in the most 
common family situations. There are no local income taxes. 
In addition to income tax, dividends are subject to social taxes. There are currently three so-
cial taxes, the impact of which is substantial. They are the generalized social contribution, the 
social security deficit contribution and the social levy.  
•  The generalized social contribution (CSG) is payable by all residents on virtually 
all types of income, unless expressly exempt. The rate is generally 7.5%; out of 
this, 5.1 percentage points are deductible for income tax purposes, if the relevant 
income is taxed at the progressive rates. 
•  The social security deficit contribution (CRDS) of 0.5% is levied, in general, on 
basically the same taxable base as the CSG. It is not deductible at all for income 
tax purposes. 
•  The social levy of 2% applies to income from immovable property and invest-
ment income including dividends. It is not deductible for income tax purposes. 
 Access to Finance and Venture  
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Combining individual income tax and social taxes, the effective tax burden on the share-
holder’s level is between (0% + 7.5% + 0.5% + 2% =) 10% and (48.09% * (1 – 0.051) + 7.5% 
+ 0.5% + 2% =) 55.64%. Accordingly, the total tax burden on profits distributed by corpora-
tions is between 5% (for newly created companies or innovative new companies distributing 
their profits to a shareholder paying only social security taxes) and 53.64% (for large compa-
nies distributing their profits to a shareholder who is in the top slice of the income tax rate). If 
a corporation accumulates its profits, the total tax can vary between 0% (for newly created 
companies or innovative new companies) and 35.43% (for large companies). 
In addition, a number of other taxes is levied on companies, including a minimum tax, a local 
business tax and several payroll taxes. The annual minimum lump-sum tax based on turn-
over is payable as shown in Table 13. It is relevant only for corporations and business entities 
having opted for corporation tax. The minimum tax is creditable against the corporate income 
tax  of  the  current  and  the  following  two  years.  Companies  whose  turnover  is  less  than 
€76,000 are exempt from this tax. 
Table 15:  Minimum tax in France 
Turnover (in €)  Minimum Tax (in €) 
up to   150,000       750 
     150,000   –        300,000    1,125 
     300,000   –        750,000    1,575 
     750,000   –     1,500,000    2,175 
  1,500,000   –     7,500,000    3,750 
  7,500,000   –   15,000,000  15,000 
15,000,000   –   75,000,000  18,750 
over   75,000,000  30,000 
Source:  IBFD 2004 
Companies engaged in business activities on France in a habitual basis are subject to a local 
business tax, regardless of their residence. The taxable base is the annual rental value of 
commercial and industrial buildings and equipment, reduced by 16%. The rates vary from 
municipality to municipality but may not exceed the following percentages of value added 
(mentioned in brackets are the rates including the tax effect, first on accumulated, second on 
distributed profits): Access to Finance and Venture  
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•  3.5% (2.26% – 3.5%; 1.62% – 3.33%) if the turnover is below €21,350,000; 
•  3.8% (2.45% – 3.8%; 1.76% – 3.61%) if the turnover is between €21,350 and 
€76,225,000; and 
•  4.0% (2.58% – 4.0%; 1.85% – 3.8%) if the turnover is above €76,225,000. 
 
A minimum business tax of 1.5% (0.97% – 1.5%; 0.7% – 1.43%) of the value added is pay-
able by companies with a turnover of €7,600,000 or more. “Value added” is defined as sales 
minus purchases and the value of inventory at the opening of the accounting year. Business 
tax is deductible for corporate income tax purposes. It should be mentioned that business tax 
brings more money to the state than corporation tax.
13 
The social solidarity tax is levied at a rate of 0.13% of the turnover of companies, excluding 
VAT. It is deductible for corporate income tax purposes. As it is deductible, the effective 
rates are 0.084% – 0.13% for an accumulating company and 0.06% – 0.123% for a company 
distributing its profits. 
A number of taxes on payroll is levied on resident as well as on non-resident companies con-
ducting business in France. All taxes described below are deductible for corporate income tax 
purposes (again, mentioned in brackets are the rates including the tax effect, first on accumu-
lated, second on distributed profits):  
•  Payroll tax is imposed on resident companies that are not subject to VAT, or at 
least 90% of whose turnover was exempt from VAT in the preceding year. Tax-
able base is the total amount of remuneration; the rates for 2004 are 
•  4.25% (2.74% – 4.25%; 1.97% – 4.04%) on the portion of the annual individ-
ual salary up to €6,789; 
•  8.50% (5.49% – 8.5%; 3.94% – 8.08%) on the portion of the annual individ-
ual salary between €6,789 and €13,563; and 
•  13.6% (8.78% – 13.6%; 6.30% – 12.92%) on the portion of the annual indi-
vidual salary exceeding €13,563. 
                                                 
13 Compare D’Hont, P., France: “Sweeping Tax Changes Affecting In/Outbound Investments”, in: TPI Review, 
October 2004. Access to Finance and Venture  
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•  Apprenticeship tax is levied on the total payroll at a rate of 0.5% (0.32% – 0.5%; 
0.23% – 0.48%). A reduced rate applies in some French departments. 
•  Vocational training tax applies to employers who employ ten employees or more. 
Such employers must invest 1.5% (0.97% – 1.5%; 0.70% – 1.43%) of payroll in 
vocational training programmes. For enterprises employing fewer than ten em-
ployees, the tax is reduced to 0.15%. Enterprises that become liable to this tax are 
exempt for the first three years and benefit from a reduced rate for the following 
three years. 
•  Construction tax applies to employers who employ ten employees or more. They 
have to invest 0.45% (0.29% – 0.45%; 0.21% – 0.43%) of the payroll of the pre-
ceding year in the construction of residential housing. Again, enterprises that be-
come liable to this tax are exempt for the first three years and benefit from a re-
duced rate for the following three years. 
 
There are social security contributions due by employers on total wages and salaries or on 
maximum amounts known as social security ceilings. For 2004, employers generally have to 
pay  contributions  between  49.6%  and  53.656%  (including  contribution  for  supplementary 
pension). Certain types of business have to pay additional contributions, in particular for acci-
dent insurance. All social security contributions are deductible for corporate income tax pur-
poses, so the effective rates are between 32.03% and 53.656% for accumulating corporations 
and between 22.99% and 50.97% for the profit distribution case. 
In France, net worth tax is not levied at the companies’ level, but companies are subject to 
real estate taxes. The most important one for companies is the property tax, which is a local 
tax due annually on all properties owned on 1 January of the relevant year. The tax is due by 
the owner and applies both to developed and undeveloped property located in France. The tax 
on developed property applies to buildings located in France. The tax is computed by apply-
ing certain coefficients determined annually by the local tax authorities to half the notional 
rental value of the property, as determined by the local land registry. The tax on undeveloped 
property  (mainly  privately  owned  land)  is  calculated  by  multiplying  80%  of  the  notional 
rental value of the property by coefficients determined by local authorities.  
Resident individuals are subject to an annual net wealth tax on the fair market value of assets 
owned on 1 January of the tax year, minus liabilities, if the net value of these assets exceeds 
€720,000. Various assets are exempt, including business assets and substantial shareholding 
(more than 25%) held by managing directors. So for the shareholder, net wealth tax applies 
only if he holds 25% or less of the company’s shares and if his total wealth has a net value of 
more than the mentioned €720,000. These conditions may not often be true for owners of 
SMEs. The rates are as follows: Access to Finance and Venture  
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Table 16:  Net wealth tax in France 
Taxable value (in €)  Rate 
up to   720,000  0.00 % 
   720,000   –    1,160,000  0.55 % 
1,160,000   –    2,300,000  0.75 % 
2,300,000   –    3,600,000  1.00 % 
3,600,000   –    6,900,000  1.30 % 
6,900,000   –  15,000,000  1.65 % 
over   15,000,000  1.80 % 
Source:  IBFD 2004 
For individual shareholders, there is no possibility of deducting the net wealth tax from the 
tax base for income tax purposes. 
Case (2): Partnerships held by individuals
14 
Resident individuals are subject to income tax on their worldwide income. The tax is gener-
ally imposed on the aggregate amount of all items of income, but there is no definition of tax-
able income. Generally speaking, taxable income is the total of the net results of each of the 
taxpayer’s income categories. The category “business income” includes profits from indus-
trial, commercial and handicraft activities; so profits realized by partnerships that do not opt 
to be taxed as companies, are taxed in the hands of the partners as business income. Business 
income is subject to the above-mentioned ordinary progressive income tax rates. A number of 
tax reductions is available, e.g. for investment in certain sectors and for the establishment of 
new enterprises. 
As all other income categories, business income is subject to two of the three social taxes 
mentioned above, i.e. the generalized social contribution (CSG) at 7.5% and the social secu-
rity deficit contribution (CRDS) at 0.5%. As business income is taxed with income tax at the 
normal rate, 5.1 percentage points of the CSG are deductible from income tax base. Unlike 
the CSG and the CRDS, the social levy of 2% does not apply to business income. 
                                                 
14 As corporate tax liability applies mandatorily on the profits of limited partners in limited partnerships, the 
following discussion concentrates on general partners´ profits. Additionally, it is assumed that the partnership 
has not opted for corporate tax liability. Access to Finance and Venture  
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Combining individual income tax and social taxes, the effective tax burden on business in-
come is between (0% + 7.5% + 0.5% =) 8% and (48.09% * (1 – 0.051) + 7.5% + 0.5% =) 
53.64%. 
The above-mentioned local business tax applies not only to corporations, but to all business 
income. The maximum rates may not exceed the following percentages of value added (men-
tioned in brackets are the rates including the tax effect): 
•  3.5% (1.62% – 3.22%) if the turnover is below €21,350,000; 
•  3.8% (1.76% – 3.5%) if the turnover is between €21,350 and €76,225,000; and 
•  4.0% (1.85% – 3.68%) if the turnover is above €76,225,000. 
 
A minimum business tax of 1.5% (0.7% – 1.38%) of the value added is payable by companies 
with a turnover of €7,600,000 or more. 
Taxes on payroll are levied on partnerships and sole proprietorships, too. The tax rates are 
the same as mentioned for corporations, but including the income tax effect, the effective 
rates are as stated in brackets: 
•  for payroll tax: 
•  4.25% (1.97% – 3.91%) on the portion of the annual individual salary up to 
€6,789; 
•  8.50% (3.94% – 7.82%) on the portion of the annual individual salary be-
tween €6,789 and €13,563; and 
•  13.6% (6.30% – 12.51%) on the portion of the annual individual salary ex-
ceeding €13,563. 
•  for apprenticeship tax: 0.5% (0.23% – 0.46%). 
•  for vocational training tax: 1.5% (0.7% – 1.38%). 
•  for construction tax: 0.45% (0.21% – 0.41%). Access to Finance and Venture  
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The social security contributions are due from all employers. For 2004, they generally have 
to pay contributions between 49.6% (22.99% – 45.63%) and 53.656% (24.87% – 49.36%). 
The annual minimum lump-sum tax based on turnover is relevant only for corporations and 
business entities having opted for corporation tax. Real estate taxes apply to partnerships, 
too. As partnerships are not subject to and business assets are exempt from net wealth tax, 
normally no net wealth tax applies. 
Case (3): Sole proprietorships 
There are no differences in France between the taxation of a partner’s share of his partner-
ship’s profit and the taxation of business income derived from a sole proprietorship. 
Germany 
Case (1): Corporations held by individuals 
The corporate income tax is levied on the various types of entities listed in the Corporate 
Income Tax Law. These include stock companies and limited liability companies, as well as 
limited partnerships with shares. All other partnerships are not taxed as separate entities. The 
rate of corporate income tax is 25%, increased to 26.38% by the solidarity surcharge of 
5.5%. 
Companies distributing profits must generally withhold dividend withholding tax at a rate of 
20%, i.e. 21.1% including the 5.5.% solidarity surcharge. The tax withheld is fully creditable 
for resident shareholders against their individual income tax liability and will not be regarded 
in the following calculations. 
Since 1 January 2001, Germany has a shareholder relief system. Dividends are taxed in the 
hands of individual shareholders by the “half-income system”, under which only one half of 
the dividends received is included in the individual’s taxable income. A transitional regime 
provides for a partial refund of corporate income tax to companies distributing profits they 
had derived under the former full imputation system. 
The individual shareholder is subject to income tax on half the dividends received by the cor-
poration. It is imposed at progressive rates under a complex formula; for 2005, the marginal 
rates vary between 0% and 42%. As the 5.5% solidarity surcharge is levied on the amount of 
tax computed according to the formula, the aggregated rates may vary between 0% and 
44.31%. Church members who are subject to unlimited tax liability are required to pay a 
church rate of 8% or 9% of their income tax payable. This tax is not regarded further. 
In general, every company that conducts business in Germany is subject to business tax. Cor-
porations are always presumed to conduct business. The taxable income for business tax is 
generally determined in the same manner as for income tax purposes, but is subject to certain Access to Finance and Venture  





Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 97  79 
 
adjustments. These adjustments refer to certain items that reduce the tax base for corporate 
income tax purposes but not for business tax purposes and vice versa. The effective rate of 
business tax depends on a federal rate and a municipal multiplier. First, the basic federal rate 
of 5% is applied to the taxable business income, resulting in a basic tax amount. Second, the 
multiplier is applied to the basic tax amount to determine the actual tax burden. The multiplier 
is fixed by the municipalities and varies according to their financial needs between 200% and 
490%. In 2004, the multiplier was 410% for Berlin and 490% for Frankfurt am Main. As 
small municipalities usually fix a lower multiplier, and as SMEs in most cases will have no 
need to be located in big cities, a below-average multiplier of 400% is taken for the following 
calculations. The solidarity surcharge is not levied on business tax. 
Business tax is deductible both for corporate income tax purposes and from its own base. Us-
ing a municipal multiplier of 400%, the aggregated income and business tax burden for 
German corporations is 38.65% and can be calculated as follows: 
aggregated tax burden on corporate level = rcit * (bcit – bt) * (1 + rss) + bt 
with rcit = corporate income tax rate;  
bcit = corporate income tax base; 
rss = rate of solidarity surcharge; and  
bt = business tax 
            = rf * mm * (bcit – bt) 
with rf = federal rate; and  
mm = municipal multiplier. 
Including the shareholder’s income tax on dividends received from the corporation as private 
income, the total tax burden equals 
total tax burden  
= rcit * (bcit – bt) * (1 + rss) + bt  
+ [1 – rcit * (bcit – bt) * (1 + rss) – bt] * 0.5 * rit * (1 + rss) 
with rit = income tax rate. 
According to the income tax rate varying between 0% and 42%, the total tax burden in the 
distribution case can vary between 38.65% and 52.24%. In the case of profit accumulation, 
the total tax amount equals 38.65% of the corporate profit. 
In Germany, there are neither payroll taxes nor a net worth tax. The following social security 
contributions – average given, as the actual rates depend on the insurer – are payable by the 
employers (2004, for the five new federal states lower rates apply): Access to Finance and Venture  
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•  pension insurance at 9.75% (5.98%; 4.66% – 5.98%) on a monthly salary up to 
€5,150; 
•  health insurance at 7.15% (4.39%; 3.41% – 4.39%) on a monthly salary up to 
€3,487.50; 
•  unemployment insurance at 3.25% (1.99%; 1.55% – 1.99%) on a monthly salary 
up to €5,150; and 
•  insurance for disability and old age at 0.85% (0.52%; 0.41% – 0.52%) on a 
monthly salary up to €3,487.50. 
As social security contributions are deductible for corporate income tax and business tax pur-
poses, values in brackets show the rates after imputing the tax effect; first value for profit ac-
cumulation, second and third for the distribution case.  
Real estate tax is levied annually on immovable property by the municipalities. It is imposed 
on the fiscal value at a basic federal rate of 0.35%. The result is multiplied by a municipal 
coefficient that ranges from 280% to 600% and raises the nominal rate to between 0.98% and 
2.1% of the fiscal value. The average rate is around 1.5%. Real estate tax is deductible for 
corporate income tax and business tax purposes; therefore the effective average rate may be 
0.92% for the profit accumulation case and between 0.72% and 0.92% for profit distribution. 
Case (2): Partnerships held by individuals 
In general, partnerships are transparent for tax purposes. Only the business tax applies di-
rectly at the company’s level. It is generally levied the same way as described above for cor-
porations; the only difference is the federal rate varying between 0% and 5% and leading to 
an effective business tax rate of 0% – 16.67%. Additionally, individual sole proprietors and 
partners are entitled to a lump-sum credit for business tax against their income tax. At least 
for partnerships located in a municipality with a low business tax multiplier, the income tax 
reduction may equal the business tax paid by the partnership; so the effective business tax 
may be around zero. A business tax of zero will be assumed for the following calculations. 
Each partner is taxed with income tax and solidarity surplus on his part of the partnership’s 
profits. The above-mentioned tax rates apply, leading to a total tax burden of 0% – 44.31%.  
Partnerships have to pay social security contributions at the same rates as corporations have 
to. As the income tax effects differ, the effective rates are 
•  for pension insurance: 5.43% – 9.75%; 
•  for health insurance: 3.98% – 7.15%; Access to Finance and Venture  
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•  for unemployment insurance: 1.81% – 3.25%; and 
•  for insurance for disability and old age: 0.47% – 0.85%. 
 
As real estate tax is deductible for income tax and business tax purposes, the effective aver-
age rate may by between 0.84% and 1.5%. 
Case (3): Sole proprietorships 
There is no difference between taxation of partnerships and of sole proprietorships in Ger-
many. No reduced tax rates for SMEs apply. For social securitization, self-employed may be 
voluntarily insured at the statutory regimes or may opt for private insurance. In both cases the 
rates are fixed by the insurance companies. 
Poland 
Case (1): Corporations held by individuals 
Corporate income tax is levied on legal entities, most notably joint-stock companies and 
limited liability companies. Partnerships are not taxable entities and, as such, partners are 
taxed individually on their share of the profits. Investment funds and pension funds are ex-
empt from corporate income tax. From 1 January 2004, the corporate income tax rate is 19% 
(previously 27%). There are neither other taxes on corporate income nor payroll taxes in Po-
land. Tax incentives are given for investments and job creation in special enterprise zones. 
Poland applies a shareholder relief system of taxation. After full taxation of profits at the 
company level, dividends are subject to a withholding tax of 19%.
15 Independent of whether 
the individual shareholder holds the shares in his private or in his business property, the 19% 
withholding tax is final. At the shareholder’s level dividends are thus not included in the total 
income. 
In Poland there are no other income taxes. No payroll tax and no net worth tax are levied. 
Nevertheless, there is a social security system that includes old-age pensions, disability in-
surance, health and maternity insurance and injury insurance. The assessment base for the 
social security contributions is the employees’ gross income as defined for income tax pur-
poses. In the case of contributions to the old-age pension and disability insurances, the maxi-
mum base is the annual equivalent of 30 projected average monthly salaries in the calendar 
year (2004: PLN 68,700). There is no ceiling for the injury insurance. 
                                                 
15 Nevertheless, if the shareholder is a corporation, too, the withholding tax is creditable against the corporate 
income tax on the shareholder’s total income. Excess credits may be carried forward indefinitely. Access to Finance and Venture  
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The contributions are payable by the employers at a nominal 9.76% for old-age pension, 
6.50% for disability insurance and 0.97% – 3.86% for injury insurance. Additionally, em-
ployers have to contribute 0.15% of the employees’ wages to the warranted employees’ claim 
funds. All contributions are deductible for corporate income tax purposes.  
Real estate tax is an annual local tax. The taxable base for all buildings is the floor area of 
the building in m
2. For land, it is the size in m
2. For fixed installations, the depreciation value 
is taken into account. The tax rates are fixed by the municipal councils, but may not exceed 
PLN 0.63 per m
2 for land used in businesses, PLN 17.42 per m
2 for buildings used in busi-
nesses and 2% of the value of fixed installations. 
The total tax burden on profits subject to corporate income tax is 19% in the case of profit 
accumulation. In the case of distribution to an individual shareholder the profit is charged 
with a total nominal tax of 19% + 0,81 * 19% = 34,39%.  
The effective social security burden after including the tax reduction effect lies between 
11.40% and 16.27% of the employees’ gross income. The effective real estate tax may not 
exceed PLN [0.63 * (1 – 0.19) =] 0.51 per m
2 for land used in businesses, PLN [17.42 * (1 – 
0.19) =] 14.11 per m
2 for buildings used in businesses and [2% * (1 – 0.19) =] 1.62% of the 
value of fixed installations. 
Case (2): Partnerships held by individuals 
The taxable income of individuals is subject to income tax. As partnerships are transparent 
for income tax purposes, partners are taxed individually on their share of the profits. In gen-
eral, business income is aggregated with income from other categories. The aggregate net 
income is subject to progressive tax rates according to the following table: 
Table 17:  Income tax rates in Poland 
Taxable income (PLN)  Tax 
up to 37,024  19% – 530.08 PLN 
37,024 – 74,048  6,504.48 + 30% on excess over 37,024 
over 74,048  17,611.68 + 40% on excess over 74,048 
Source:  IBFD 2004 
Taxpayers can opt for a 19% flat-rate taxation of business income. If so, they are not enti-
tled to any personal deductions and credits, except credits for the obligatory health insurance 
contributions. By using this option, they achieve being taxed like a corporation accumulating 
its profits. Access to Finance and Venture  
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Additionally, the Polish tax system offers a special tax regime for private individuals conduct-
ing small-scale business activities. The following requirements apply: 
•  The activity was started by individuals independently or in the form of a civil 
partnership during the relevant tax year. Or: 
•  In the year proceeding the relevant tax year, the amount of turnover received by 
an individual or by all partners of a partnership did not exceed PLN 250,000. 
 
For such small-scale businesses the turnover is the taxable base. Flat-rates apply according to 
the business activity: 
•  20% for independent activities of individuals, 
•  17% for some services, 
•  8.5% for services in general and on agents commissions, 
•  5.5% for production, construction and transport services, and 
•  3.0% for commercial activities, catering businesses and sea fishing. 
 
Depending on the tax regime chosen, the effective social security burden after including the 
tax reduction effect is between 10.43% and 20.27% of the employees´ gross income. If the 
partner opts for flat-rate taxation, the effective burden equals that for corporations (11.40% – 
16.27%). The effective real estate tax may not exceed PLN 0.63 (flat-tax option: PLN 0.51) 
per m
2 for land used in businesses, PLN 17.42 (flat-tax option: PLN 14.11) per m
2 for build-
ings used in businesses and 2% (flat-tax option: 1.62%) of the value of fixed installations. 
Case (3): Sole proprietorships 
Generally,  the  same  tax  regulations  apply  for  sole  proprietorships  as  for  partnerships.  It 
should also be mentioned that self-employed people are required to pay the same social secu-
rity contributions for themselves as for their employees. The assessment base is the amount 
declared by the taxpayer. Access to Finance and Venture  
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United Kingdom 
Case (1): Corporations held by individuals 
Corporations are subject to corporation tax (corporate income tax), which is levied on corpo-
rate profits and other forms on income, as well as on chargeable gains of companies. The gen-
eral rate of corporation tax is 30%. This rate applies to all closely owned investment holding 
companies and to other companies with taxable profits above GBP 1.5 million. As there are a 
starting rate of 0% and a small companies rate of 19%, combined with two areas of marginal 
tax correction, the effective tax rates on profits in each income bracket are as follows: 
Table 18:  Effective corporate tax rates in the United Kingdom 
Taxable profits (brackets in GBP)  Tax rate for bracket (%) 
                           up to 10,000                          0% 
                10,001 –      50,000                  23.75 % 
                50,001 –    300,000                        19% 
              300,001 – 1,500,000                  32.75 % 
                       over 1,500,000                        30% 
Source:  IBFD 2004 
The UK tax system combines elements of partial imputation and shareholder relief and con-
tains no withholding taxes on dividends distributed to resident shareholders. First, each divi-
dend carries a tax credit of one ninth of the dividend amount which is included in the dividend 
income, so that dividend income = 10/9 * dividend. The tax credit can be set off against the 
individual’s income tax liability on the dividend plus the credit and is not refundable. This is 
the partial imputation part of the tax system.  
Second, dividends are taxed with a reduced tax rate of 10% (respectively 32.5%) instead of up 
to 40% for savings and other income, which forms the shareholder relief part. As the share-
holder’s taxable income is sorted in the three mentioned groups with dividend forming the top 
slice, savings the middle and other income parts the bottom, dividends will often be taxed 
with the higher rate of 32.5%. The income tax rates for the fiscal year from 6 April 2003 to 
5 April 2004 are: Access to Finance and Venture  
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Table 19:  Income tax rates in the United Kingdom 




      up to 1,960     10    %     10 %     10 %     (lower rate) 
1,961 – 30,500     10    %     20 %     22 %     (basic rate) 
     over 30,500     32.5 %     40 %     40 %     (higher rate) 
Source:  IBFD 2004 
Combining the tax rates for dividends with the elements of partial imputation, the following 
equation emerges: 
effective income tax on dividend = dividend * (10/9 * tax rate) – dividend * 1/9 
= dividend * (10/9 * tax rate – 1/9) 
Following:  tax rate = 10%    =>  effective income tax rate = 0% 
    tax rate = 32.5%  =>  effective income tax rate = 25% 
 
There are two investment incentive reliefs applying to investors in companies: The enterprise 
investment scheme (EIS) is applicable for investments in the form of a 3-year commitment 
made by an unconnected investor in eligible shares of a company, neither quoted at the time 
of the issue of shares under the scheme nor planned to become quoted. Participation is limited 
to  companies  with  gross  assets  of  less  than  GBP 10 million  before  and  no  more  than 
GBP 11 million after the investment is made. At least 80% of the money invested must be 
employed by the company for the purposes of its qualifying business activity within twelve 
months. The residual 20% have to be equally employed within the following twelve months. 
If these conditions match, the investor is granted a relief at the lower rate of income tax (10%) 
on investments up to GBP 150,000 per year. The relief is granted against the investor’s in-
come tax if no significant value is returned to him within a period of at least twelve months. 
The relief may be withdrawn if the investor disposes of the shares in the company within the 
first three years or if he receives value from the company. 
The venture capital trust (VCT) is a collective investment scheme of which the main fea-
tures are 
•  that the VCT is an investment company quoted on the stock exchange, having 
70% of its investments in unquoted qualifying companies and distributing 85% of 
its income; and Access to Finance and Venture  
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•  that at least 80% of the money invested must be employed by the company for the 
purposes of its qualifying business activity within twelve months. The residual 
amount must be so employed within the following twelve months. 
 
Given these features, relief is provided at the lower rate of income tax (10%) on investments 
up to GBP 100,000 per year; additionally distributions of the VCT’s income are exempt from 
tax. The relief may be withdrawn if the VCT shares are disposed of within three years. 
There is no payroll tax in the United Kingdom. In the field of social security contributions, 
National Insurance Contributions (NIC) paid by employers are fixed by reference to the em-
ployees’ weekly earnings. Depending on the contribution scheme they may vary from 0% to 
12.8% of the wages paid. They are deductible for corporation tax purposes. 
A net worth tax does not exist, but there is a real estate tax levied on market rents. Rateable 
values are reassessed every five years; the next revaluation, based on 2003 values, comes into 
force on 1 April 2005. Transitional relief applies to phase in significant increases or decreases 
in rateable value over a period of time. The uniform business rate (UBR) is set annually by 
the government. For the tax year ending 31 March 2004, the rate for England is 4.44%; simi-
lar rates apply in Scotland and Wales. Real estate tax is deductible for corporation tax pur-
poses. 
The total income tax burden on both the corporation’s and the shareholder’s level depends 
on amount and treatment of profit: The corporation tax may be between 0% and 30% with 
marginal tax correction up to 32.75%. In the case of profit accumulation this tax is the effec-
tive burden. If the remaining 70%
16 to 100% are distributed, the dividend will be subject to 
effective income tax with 0% or 25%, using the partial imputation system. Accordingly, the 
sum of both tax levels in the distribution case lies between (0% + 0% =) 0% and (30% + 25% 
on remaining 70%) = 47.5%. There are no local income taxes for companies; neither are there 
any business taxes on corporate income.
17 There are no other taxes on individuals’ income. 
Using the calculated total income tax burden, the effective burden of social security contri-
butions varies from 0% to 12.8%. The effective real estate tax burden in England has its 
maximum between 2.33% and 4.44% of the rateable value; Scotland and Wales are calculated 
accordingly. 
Case (2): Partnerships held by individuals 
                                                 
16 The marginal tax correction is used for equalising marginal and average tax rate and will not be discussed 
further. 
17 Corporation tax is levied only on income from oil and gas production. Petroleum revenue tax (PRT) applies 
only to income from oil fields. Access to Finance and Venture  
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In the United Kingdom, a resident individual is taxable on his worldwide income. Income tax 
is assessed according to a scheduler system, where business income is subsumed under “trad-
ing and professional income”. As partnerships are transparent for tax purposes, partners are 
taxed individually on their share of the profits. In general, income of all schedules is aggre-
gated and subject to progressive tax rates according to the table given in Fig. 17: “Income tax 
rates in the United Kingdom”. Trading and professional income is typically “other income” 
and is taxed with 10%, 22% and 40%. 
Additionally, individuals are subject to capital gains tax (CGT) on their worldwide capital 
gains. Capital gains tax is levied at the same above-mentioned income tax rates of 10%, 20% 
and 40%. 
There are neither other taxes on income nor any payroll taxes. But, as a part of social security 
contributions, payments by the self-employed do not give any entitlement to social security 
benefits; it is de facto an additional income tax. The so-called Class 4-contributions to Na-
tional Insurance are payable at 8% of annual earnings between GBP 4,615 and the upper earn-
ings limit of GBP 30,940, and at 1% on the excess over GBP 30,940. No payment is due from 
taxpayers who have reached pensionable age (65 for men and 60 for women) by the beginning 
of the year of assessment. Social security contributions are not deductible for income tax pur-
poses, so the Class 4-contributions are just added to the income tax rate. Effectively, taxation 
can reach 40% income tax plus 1% insurance contribution, i.e. 41% total.
18 
In Class 2 of National Insurance, the self-employed have to pay an additional flat rate of 
GBP 2 per week. A small earnings exemption limit of GBP 4,095 per annum is applicable. 
For social security contributions paid for employees, the same regulations as described for 
corporations are relevant. 
Combining income tax with social security rates, the effective burden of social security con-
tributions paid by partnerships to their employees lies between 0% and 12.8%. The maxi-
mum effective real estate tax burden in England for partnerships varies between 2.62% and 
4.44% of the rateable value; Scotland and Wales are calculated accordingly. 
Case (3): Sole proprietorships 
There are no special tax or social security regulations for sole proprietorships in the United 
Kingdom, so the same rules apply as for partnerships.  
6.2.4  Comparison of the Taxation in the Selected Countries and Conclu-
sions for the Improvement of the Taxation of Innovative SMEs 
The following table gives an overview on the taxation of corporations as discussed. 
                                                 
18 There is a peak between GPB 30,500 and GBP 30,940, where 40 % income tax and 8 % insurance contribution 
apply. Access to Finance and Venture  
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Summary: Accumulation versus distribution of profits 
Table 20:  Taxation of corporations 
  Austria  France  Germany  Poland  UK 
Corporation held by individual 
     è è è è Aggregated income tax burden 
Profit accu-
mulation 
25%  0% – 35.43%  38.65%  19%  0% – 30% 
Profit distri-
bution 
25% – 43.75%  5% – 53.64%  38.65% – 
52.24% 







uity (taxed at 
25%) 
Reduced tax 
rates for new or 
innovative 
companies 








above 75% of 
current income 




-.-  -.- 
      è è è è Effective total burden of payroll taxes and social security contributions 








0% – 12.8% 
      è è è è Effective real estate tax burden 





0.72% – 0.92% 
Max. 
PLN 14.11 per 
m
2 
2.33% – 4.44% 
Source:   Own production 
Note:Areas with yellow background show main legal form for SMEs in the respective coun-
try. Access to Finance and Venture  
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All countries under scrutiny have a so-called lock-in effect, i.e. the total tax burden on profits 
increases when corporations distribute their profits. In general, this is economically accepted 
and not seen as a critical part of the tax system. But for SMEs, which often have to distribute 
at least a part of their profits (supposing their shareholders need them for a living), this tax 
increase is a problem. Accordingly, SMEs’ shareholders try to decrease the total tax burden 
by making contracts with their own companies. Credit contracts are only one possibility to 
avoid “double taxation” on both the company’s and the shareholder’s level. 
In general, the tax liability on accumulated profits should be as low as possible in a states 
fiscal system. By reducing this rate, corporations are enabled to re-invest an increasing part of 
their profits. This would be a very useful instrument of enforcing corporations to an easier 
self-financing. But, as the shareholder-value discussion in the 1990s has shown, the lock-in 
effect may have negative implications for large corporations: In those companies management 
may be misguided by the lock-in effect and try to accumulate as much profit as possible. 
Therefore, capital stays in the corporations, obtaining a lower return on capital as would be 
possible by the shareholders themselves.  
This downside of the lock-in effect is no problem for SMEs, though. Their most urgent need 
is to build up equity. It should therefore be rendered possible to accumulate as much profit as 
possible for SMEs. The corporation taxes in France and the United Kingdom show that this 
differentiation between SMEs and large corporations can easily be made by introducing re-
duced tax rates for small- and medium-sized companies. Starting rates of 0% (in France: 
only for newly created companies in the initial two years) are followed by a modest taxation 
(15% for SMEs in France, 19% in the United Kingdom). These tax concessions are granted to 
corporations until reaching certain profit- or turnover levels, so these corporations are able to 
amass the equity they need for the next years’ growth. 
Special emphasis should be put on the above-mentioned tax rate incentives for newly created 
companies and/or innovative new companies in France:  Full and partial exemptions are 
granted to companies created prior to 31 December 2009. SMEs at least 50% of whose capital 
is owned by individuals are granted a complete corporate income tax exemption in the initial 
three years of the innovative activity, reduced to 50% in the following two years. Addition-
ally, exemptions from various other taxes, e.g. business tax and social security contributions, 
are granted. 
If a corporate income tax rate reduction seems impossible, a reduced total tax burden can be 
reached by abolishing additional taxes for SMEs, e.g. the social surcharge in Germany. 
Reduced starting rates for corporate income taxation have a second positive effect: As has 
been shown, SMEs’ shareholders may need profit distributions to finance their cost of living. 
If their corporations are taxed at a low rate, and they themselves pay a low individual income 
tax rate on the dividend received, the total tax burden stays so a low that it should be accept-
able even for start-ups. For example the calculations for France and the United Kingdom Access to Finance and Venture  
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show that total tax rates of 0% or near 0% (France: 5% upwards) can be reached even in the 
distribution case. 
Regarding payroll taxes, real estate taxes and social security contributions, it has been shown 
that increasing income tax rates reduce the effective burden. But, these taxes have to be paid 
even in years without profits. So only when the corporation pays no income taxes, there is no 
tax effect to lower the burden of non-income taxes. For SMEs with their often quite weak 
financial position, paying taxes in periods with losses can be difficult. Accordingly, mini-
mum taxes –no matter if they have to be paid in general or only in periods after losses – 
should generally be avoided. Access to Finance and Venture  
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Table 21:  Taxation of partnerships and sole proprietorships 
  Austria  France  Germany  Poland  UK 
Partnership held by individual / Sole proprietorship 
      è è è è Aggregated income tax burden 
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As Fig. 38 shows, taxation of partnerships’ profits regularly covers a broader range of effec-
tive tax rates. As taxation of individuals usually starts at or near 0%, SME-partnerships with 
comparably low profits per partner may have an effective tax burden much smaller than cor-
porations of the same size. It is striking that just in those countries with a progressive corpo-
rate income tax rate (France, United Kingdom) partnerships are less important legal forms, 
whereas companies in countries with a flat-rate for corporate taxation mostly choose partner-
ships as the legal form of their corporation. As founding innovative SMEs is a risk-intensive 
undertaking, the creation of new companies may be simplified by a more favourable taxa-
tion of risk-reducing SME-corporations. 
For  comparing  different  countries’  tax  burden  on  partnerships,  it  is  necessary  to  show  at 
which rates income taxation starts and at which tax base it reaches the highest tax rate. For an 
overview over the EU-countries compare Fig. 38. 










Source:  Bundesfinanzministerium 2004 
In order to decide which profit- or turnover-limits are adequate for the definition of an SME 
corporation, the country’s income tax rates should be studied. Fig. 38 shows that a “high” 
income (or profit) for tax purposes can only be defined according to the environment of the 
taxpayer. In the same way, the definition of a small or medium sized corporation should be 
differentiated from country to country. 
As the total burden of payroll taxes, social security contributions and real-estate taxes in-
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SMEs as for large partnerships, where partners pay maximum tax rates. A proposal could be 
the instalment of “introductory rates” for these taxes and contributions, so that employees 
are not less expensive for large companies than for smaller ones. 
6.2.5  Treatment of Debt-financing 
If equity-financing is not sufficient for covering an SME’s financial needs, debt-financing will 
be considered as the second instrument. As has been shown, two alternatives exist for debt-
financing. Alternative 1: The shareholder has no private capital he could give to his company. 
In this case the loan has to be granted by a bank or any other credit institute. Alternative 2: 
The shareholder has private capital. In this case he will consider if financing his company by 
debt is less tax-expensive than applying new equity. In this chapter, the tax effects of both 
alternatives will be discussed. Again, we start with a view on the general system of taxing 
debts in Austria, France, Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom.  
As sole proprietorships have no legal identity, they cannot close contracts with credit insti-
tutes; this has to be done by the owner. Accordingly, there is no legal possibility for individu-
als to close a contract with their own sole proprietorship. Thus this legal form will not be dis-
cussed in this chapter. 
Austria 
Case (1): Corporations held by individuals 
In general, interest on loans and other debts paid by a corporation and economically con-
nected with any type of taxable income at the receiver is deductible. Thus the interest pay-
ment to a bank or other credit institute reduces the corporate income tax of the corporation 
(25%). 
Interest payments to shareholders or parties related to shareholders are subject to arm’s 
length standards. The test consists of two questions, one referring to the suitability of the 
debt-equity ratio (so called “thin capitalization”), and the other concerning the reasonability of 
the interest rate. 
Although there are no specific thin-capitalization rules in Austria, the Administrative Court 
has established certain broad and rather liberal guidelines that are used to determine whether 
the equity for commercial tax purposes is adequate for the purpose of taxation. If the equity is 
inadequate, a portion of the indebtedness to shareholders may be regarded as the equivalent of 
shareholders’ equity. Interest paid on loans that are regarded as “disguised capital” will there-
fore be treated as hidden profit distribution. Usually, this rule applies only to foreign inves-
tors. 
Interest charged at excessively high rates on loans granted by shareholders or affiliates may 
be deemed a “hidden profit distribution”. Such interest is then not deductible and is taxed as Access to Finance and Venture  
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distributed profit on both the level of the corporation and of the shareholder. As the Austrian 
tax system offers the possibility to deduct fictitious interest, there is no tax reason for individ-
ual shareholders to finance their corporations by debt. If an interest rate above the mentioned 
average rate on the secondary market, increased by 0.8 percentage points, is stipulated, the 
problem of discussing the justification of this rate with the tax authorities will occur. Usually, 
no advantage is gained by this procedure. 
If the loan is contracted according to the arm’s length standards, interest paid to the share-
holder reduces the total tax burden from 25% to 43.75%. At the shareholder’s level it is taxed 
with a withholding tax of 25%. For resident shareholders, the withholding tax constitutes only 
a prepayment of the individual income tax
19 and is credited against the final tax liability of 
0% to 50%. Taking both levels together, there is a total tax burden of -43.75% to +25%. It has 
to be mentioned that expenses incurring at the shareholders level are not deductible for tax 
purposes. 
Case (2): Partnerships held by individuals 
As for corporations, interest on loans and other debts paid by a partnership to a bank or 
other credit institute reduces the tax basis calculated at the partnership level and accordingly 
the income tax of the shareholding individual. The tax reduction is related to the partner’s 
income tax burden that may be between 0% and 50%. 
Interest payments to partners are included in the tax base for income tax purposes. As in 
Austria, there is no difference in taxation of business income and investment income derived 
from a general or limited partnership, the total tax burden lies between 0% and 50%.  
France 
Case (1): Corporations held by individuals 
In France, duly substantiated expenses incurred for the purpose of acquiring and preserving 
taxable income are deductible. Accordingly, financial charges are generally deductible. Cer-
tain limitations apply for interest paid to shareholders.  
In order to avoid thin capitalization, the deduction of interest paid to shareholders, who 
manage a company “in law or in fact” or own more than 50% of its share capital or voting 
rights, is limited to interest on that amount of debt not exceeding 150% of equity. No deduc-
tion is allowed unless the capital is fully paid. The amount of debt to be taken into considera-
                                                 
19 Types of interest that are subject to a final withholding tax include interest on deposits and other debt claims 
with certain banks, interest on certain securities, including convertible and profit-sharing bonds, income from 
participations in investment funds, and similar participations and interest on securities issued by international 
institutions after 30 September 1992. Access to Finance and Venture  
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tion is that collectively owned by all such shareholders. It has to mention that the French tax 
administration is actively considering tightening France’s thin capitalization legislation.
20 
French-source interest is generally subject to income tax at the above-mentioned progressive 
rates. However, a final levy (prélèvement libératoire) at flat rates may apply. For residents, it 
is generally optional, except with respect to a few types of interest for which it is compulsory. 
Where the final levy applies, the deduction of incurred expenses is generally not allowed. The 
rates of the final levy vary considerably; however, 16% on interest on corporate bonds and 
loans normally apply. Residents must add social taxes, which are not deductible for share-
holders charged with a reduced flat income tax rate. So the tax burden on the shareholders 
level in this case is 16% + 7.5% + 0.5% + 2% = 26%. 
If interest received by the shareholder is taxed with progressive income tax rates, 7.5% CSG 
is deductible for income tax purposes by the amount of 5.1 percentage points. CRDS of 0.5% 
and the social levy of 2% are not deductible. Combining individual income tax and social 
taxes, the effective tax burden on the shareholder-creditor’s level is between (0% + 7.5% + 
0.5% + 2% =) 10% and (48.09% * (1 – 0.051) + 7.5% + 0.5% + 2% =) 55.64%. As compared 
to equity-financing, where taxes are due between 0% and 35.43% in the accumulation case 
and between 5% and 53.64% in the distribution case, debt-financing a corporation can gener-
ally have a tax-reducing effect only when opting for the 16% flat rate. It has to be mentioned 
that taxpayers opting for flat-rate taxation are not allowed to deduct expenses incurred. 
Case (2): Partnerships held by individuals
21 
As it is not possible to opt for the final levy of 16% on interest received by a transparent part-
nership, the financing partner can choose between 8% – 53.64% income tax on business in-
come or 10% – 55.64% income tax on investment income. As social levy of 2% applies to 
investment  income  only,  equity-financing  a  partnership  is  generally  better  than  debt-
financing. For tax planning purposes, partners have the possibility to opt for corporate income 
tax liability (see discussion above). 
Germany 
Case (1): Corporations held by individuals 
Interest paid to a bank or other credit institute is generally deductible as business expense 
for corporate income tax and business tax purposes. But, corrections of the corporate income 
tax base for business tax purposes are strongly influenced by the financial structure of the 
company. For instance, only 50% of interest payments on loans exceeding 12 months (“long-
term loans”) are deductible from the business tax base. This corrects all types of interest, even 
interest paid to a bank or other credit institute. Accordingly, interest payments are taxes with a 
                                                 
20 See D´Hont, P., France: “Sweeping Tax Changes Affecting In/Outbound Investments”, in: TPI Review, Octo-
ber 2004. 
21 The following discussion concentrates on general partnerships that have not opted for corporate tax liability. Access to Finance and Venture  
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business tax of 8.33% and accordingly do not reduce the corporation’s total tax burden by the 
above-calculated 38.65% on accumulated profits or 38.65% – 52.24% on distributed profits. 
The calculation has to be 
total tax burden avoided by interest payment  
= rcit * (bcit – bt/2) * (1 + rss) + bt/2  
 + [1 – rcit * (bcit – bt/2) * (1 + rss) – bt/2] * 0.5 * rit * (1 + rss). 
The total tax burden avoided by €1 interest payment is €0.3251 (32.51%) on accumulated 
profits and €0.3251 – €0.4746 (32.51% – 47.46%) on distributed profits. 
In Germany, an interest withholding tax is imposed only on interest from convertible bonds, 
profit-sharing bonds, participation loans and participation of silent partners, as well as on in-
terest paid by banks and on certain bonds to residents. So neither on interest paid by a corpo-
ration to a bank or other credit institute, nor on interest paid to shareholders a withholding tax 
is levied.  
Interest paid on long-term loans by corporations to their shareholders holding a substantial 
interest is treated as a hidden profit distribution if the interest is paid on excessive debt fi-
nancing. A substantial interest exists if a shareholder directly or indirectly owns more than 
25% of the nominal capital of the company. However, the interest is generally treated as a 
hidden  profit  distribution  only  if  the  interest  payments  to  the  same  shareholder  exceed 
€250,000 per year. Small companies may not pay interest above this amount, but medium-
sized companies in the hand of only a few shareholders may have problems with the anti-
avoidance regulations. 
Debts are deemed to be excessive if they exceed the prescribed debt-equity ratios (thin capi-
talization). The debt-equity ratios depend on the nature of the debt financing. A distinction is 
made between two kinds of debt: 
•  For debt on which fixed interest is paid, a debt-equity ratio (safe haven) of 1.5 : 1 
is accepted. Interest on excessive debt is not deductible and is treated as a hidden 
profit distribution, unless the third-party test is met. For this test, the taxpayer 
must  demonstrate  that  an  unrelated  person  would  also  have  granted  the  loan. 
Fixed interest is interest calculated as a percentage of the principal, which is not 
dependent on the debtor’s profit or turnover; and 
•  Variable interest is not deductible. This type of interest includes payments on 
profit-participating loans, participations or contributions by silent partners and 
other liabilities, the interest of which is not calculated exclusively as a percentage 
of the principal. The tax authorities include fixed interest-bearing liabilities in the Access to Finance and Venture  
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variable interest category if the loan contract stipulates that interest need not be 
paid in a loss situation. 
From tax year 2004, interest treated as non-deductible for corporate income tax under the 
thin-capitalization rules is no longer deductible for business tax purposes. So interest treated 
as a hidden profit distribution carries a total tax burden of 38.65% – 52.24%, which is 
equal in the case of equity-financing and profit distribution. 
If interest is paid to a shareholder on the arm’s length principle, the individual holding the 
shares  as private assets  has to pay income tax plus solidarity surcharge between 0%  and 
44.31%. The corporation additionally has to pay 8.33% business tax, leading to a total tax 
burden of 8.33% to 52.64%. Thus a shareholder in the top proportional part of the income tax 
rate is – according to the safe haven – not able to lower the total tax burden by financing the 
corporation by debt. Assuming that SMEs’ shareholders are levied with a lower income tax 
rate, there might be a tax reducing effect, at least if the profits would have been accumulated 
otherwise. 
Case (2): Partnerships held by individuals 
In Germany, interest paid by a partnership to its partner is treated as business income at the 
partner’s level for income tax and for business tax purposes. So there is no tax effect in debt-
financing the own partnership. Partnerships paying interest to a bank or other credit insti-
tute are taxed with a business tax on half the interest paid. So €1 interest paid leads to a busi-
ness tax burden of 0% – 8.33% at the company’s level. As the partner is granted an income 
tax credit, the aggregated effective tax burden for both levels is near or equal to zero. 
Poland 
Case (1): Corporations held by individuals 
Expenses incurred for the purpose of obtaining taxable income are deductible, unless other-
wise provided by law. Interest payments to a bank or other credit institute thus reduce the 
corporate income tax of the corporation. Receipts and expenses are also generally treated as 
income once they become due and payable; a cash accounting method applies to interest. 
Interest paid on a loan granted by a resident shareholder is deductible, provided that the 
shareholder does not benefit from income tax incentives or exemptions.
22 Interest paid to a 
non-resident shareholder owning at least 25% of the share  capital or by  a  group of non-
resident shareholders owning in aggregate at least 25% of the share capital, is not deductible 
                                                 
22 A final withholding tax of 19 % is levied only on those interests derived from bank accounts, on securities 
issued by the state and on bonds issued by local authorities, as well as income from participations in invest-
ment funds and from withdrawal of such funds. Access to Finance and Venture  
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if a debt-equity ratio of 3:1 is exceeded. For resident shareholders, there are no specific thin-
capitalization rules or penalties for excessively high interest rates.  
Interest paid to resident individual shareholders reduces the total tax burden from 19% (for 
accumulated profits on the corporation’s level) to 34.39% (for distributed profits on both the 
corporation’s and the shareholder’s level). At the shareholder’s level the interest is taxed with 
the normal marginal income tax rate of 19% to 40%. In so far as the taxation of corporate 
profits is lower than the income tax on individuals’ interest income, there is no tax advantage 
for debt-financing in Poland. So at least for shareholders that reach the marginal income tax 
rate of 40%, equity-financing is the favourable alternative. 
Case (2): Partnerships held by individuals 
Only receipts derived as a result of business operations are treated as business income. Al-
though the receipts are generally treated as income on the date they become due and payable, 
in the case of interest a cash basis is applied. As income tax is levied on the aggregate net 
income from all categories, there are usually no differences in taxation of business or invest-
ment income. But if the taxpayer opts for the 19% flat-rate taxation of business income or for 
the taxation of small-scale businesses mentioned above, this makes equity-financing of part-
nerships more favourable than debt-financing. 
United Kingdom 
Case (1): Corporations held by individuals 
In order to arrive at the taxable trading profits, expenses are deductible, provided that they are 
revenue in nature and that they are wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the pur-
poses of the trade. In general, interest is treated as trading expenditure where it is paid in re-
spect of a loan taken up for trading purposes. Otherwise, a net deficit of interest receipts and 
payments is deductible as a non-trading item from the total profits of the company. The cor-
poration has to withhold a 20% tax on the annual payment of interest. This tax is offset 
against the amount of tax owed at the creditor’s level. 
Excess interest payments from thinly capitalized resident companies may be treated as 
dividend payments. Only the excess of what would have been paid between unconnected par-
ties dealing at arm’s length, making allowances for the debt-equity ratio, rate of interest and 
other terms that would have been agreed between unconnected parties is treated as dividend. 
There is no fixed debt-equity ratio, but a ratio of 1:1 is normally accepted. It has to be men-
tioned that his rule applies only to corporations held by a shareholder with at least 75% of the 
total shares or to loans between “sister companies” that are owned by the same person with at 
least 75%. 
As far as the loan is contracted according to arm’s length standards, each € interest paid 
reduces the corporation tax in the case of profit accumulation between zero and 30 Cent. In Access to Finance and Venture  
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the case of profit distribution, interest reduces the effective tax of 0% to 47.5%. As the indi-
vidual shareholder pays 10%, 22% or 40% income tax on the interest received,
23 in the major-
ity of cases financing the corporation by equity and accumulating the profits will be the tax 
optimal solution, followed by debt-financing it. The largest amount of tax will be paid if prof-
its are distributed as dividend. 
Case (2): Partnerships held by individuals 
The general condition for the deduction of expenses is that they have been incurred wholly 
and exclusively for the purposes of the business or profession. There are restrictions on the 
deductability of certain types of expenses. These include expenses of a capital nature. As 
there is no general difference in the taxation of interest or business income, specifying pay-
ments of partnerships is not as important in the United Kingdom as it may be in other coun-
tries. 
 
6.2.6  Summary: Treatment of Debt-financing in the Selected Countries 
In the following figure, the tax consequences of financing a corporation by debt are aggre-
gated. As has been shown, debt-financing usually leads to a decrease in corporate income tax, 
but to an increase in tax at the creditor’s level. If the creditor equals the shareholder, the 
shareholder’s level has to be included in the aggregation. The tax effect of interest payments 
to credit institutes is thus calculated as the avoided tax on accumulated profits. The tax effect 
on interest payments to shareholders is the sum of (negative) avoided tax on distributed prof-
its and (positive) tax on the interest received at the shareholder’s level. 
                                                 
23 The reduced basis rate of 20 % applies only to capital gains and to income from savings sources, i.e. bank and 
building society interest, government securities, National Savings first option bonds, authorized unit trust and 
personal equity plan loans and deposits, and to the income of a purchased life annuity. Access to Finance and Venture  





Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 97  100 
 
Table 22:  Debt-financing corporations  
  Austria  France  Germany  Poland  UK 
Corporation held by individual 
      è è è è Tax effect of interest payment according to arm’s length standard 
To credit 
institute* 
(25%)  (35.43%) – 
0% 
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cepted 
Source: Own production 
Note:  Red values in brackets are negative.  
  Areas with yellow background show main legal form for SMEs in the respective 
country. 
  * = Compared with profit accumulation. 
  ** = Compared with profit distribution. 
 
It is shown that debt-financing a company can generally reduce the total tax burden. For loans 
granted by credit institutes, the combination of leverage effect and tax shield makes debt-
financing an easy way for reducing taxation at corporate level.  
If shareholders can grant the company loan themselves, the possibility to finance their cor-
poration by own credit can be tax reducing, depending on the tax rate the shareholder has to Access to Finance and Venture  
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pay on interest received. Especially for SMEs with shareholders not reaching the top rates of 
progressive income taxation, debt-financing can be an instrument for reducing the tax burden. 
Extra attention has to be paid to thin-capitalisation rules in the surveyed countries, as the 
key factor of local tax systems impacting on private equity investment is the deductibility of 
interest including thin capitalisation rules (see Fig. 39). When tax authorities tighten the thin 
capitalisation measure for entities, they are challenging the company’s ability to deduct inter-
est which is deemed to be above an arm’s length rate or above an amount that would be lent 
by a third party. The company’s tax charge is increased as it is no longer able to benefit from 
leverage effect and tax shield. This effect is the stronger the wider the spread between the tax 
effects of equity-financing and debt-financing is.  
Fig. 39: Key tax factors impacting on private equity investment 
 
Source:  PwC 2004b 
Accordingly, thin-capitalisation rules should be totally abolished, at least as far as the interest 
is not subject to a tax reduction or exemption at the creditor’s level. The shareholder’s free-
dom of financing his own corporation should be more important than the country’s fiscal 
dignity. An often mentioned reason for thin-cap-rules is the need of states to avoid tax base 
spill-over to foreign countries. As the European Court of Justice has judged in 2002 (“Lank-
horst-Hohorst” verdict), European Member States are not allowed to discriminate share-
holders (or creditors) from other Member States, compared to taxation of domestic share-
holders (or creditors). Therefore, all thin-cap-rules in European Member States, whether of 
national or general, should be abolished and – if needed – substituted by an adequate regula-
tion for offshore-transactions. Access to Finance and Venture  
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Table 23:  Debt-financing partnerships 
  Austria  France  Germany  Poland  UK 
Partnership held by individual 
      è è è è Tax effect of interest payment 
To credit 
institute 













Source:   Own production 
Note:  Red values in brackets are negative.  
  Areas with yellow background show main legal form for SMEs in the respective 
country. 
 
As partnerships in the considered countries are transparent for tax purposes, in most cases no 
tax reduction can be achieved by their partners financing them by loans. Only debt-financing 
by credit institutes reduces the total tax burden (via leverage effect and tax shield). Other 
than Austria, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, only Poland provides the possibility 
of tax-reduction as it offers a 19% flat-rate on all business income independent of the legal 
form. For Germany it has to be said, that the 50% interest correction of the business tax base 
is an additional charge for those companies and shareholders that are not able to finance the 
business themselves. Instead of correcting part of the above-mentioned business tax, German 
fiscal authorities should think about abolishing this tax. 
6.3  Taxation of Venture Capital Companies 
For venture capital companies, each investment in SMEs is a decision driven by risk and re-
turn. The two most important tax questions for venture capital companies thus are 
•  How are losses treated for tax purposes? and 
•  What tax effects occur on profits? Access to Finance and Venture  
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In general, a venture capital company will invest in risk-limited partnerships (as the German 
“GmbH & Co. KG”) or in corporations (where liability is limited to the corporation’s assets). 
Losses occurring at the transparent partnership’s level may be used for tax reduction at the 
venture capital company’s level, if the national tax system allows this. Losses incurred by a 
corporation the venture capital company has invested in, usually cannot be used for the ven-
ture capital company’s tax purposes, as corporations are mainly intransparent. But, some tax 
systems allow an extraordinary depreciation on shares with a reduced going-concern value. 
Extraordinary depreciation on value-reduced shares 
Austria 
Financial assets (i.e. participations) may be written down to a lower going-concern value (ex-
traordinary depreciation) even if the reduction of value is not expected to be permanent. The 
value of financial assets that were written down in a previous year have to be adjusted if the 
reason for the depreciation no longer exists. 
France 
Provisions may be made to cover the decrease in value of assets which may not be depreci-
ated (e.g. portfolio shares) on the condition that such a decrease in value is reversible. 
Germany 
Extraordinary depreciation on shares is corrected for tax purposes. 
Poland 
No extraordinary depreciation on shares exists. 
Recommendation 
A general advice on how far to allow extraordinary depreciation on shares held by venture 
capital companies cannot be given. Generally, it should fit into the tax system applied in the 
country, e.g. Germany, where losses can not be deducted and losses and value are treated 
equally. It is more important how losses realised by the disposal of shares are treated at the 
venture capital company’s level. 
Capital losses 
If the venture capital company sells its shares of the loss-producing corporation, a loss may 
occur as the historical cost may exceed the selling price. This is a typical risk for venture capi-
tal companies, that keep a balance between the high return and high risk of innovative SMEs.  Access to Finance and Venture  
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Austria 
Capital losses are treated in the same way as ordinary losses. 
France 
Capital losses are generally deemed to be and treated as ordinary losses. 
Germany 
Capital losses from the alienation of shares in other resident or non-resident companies or 
from the liquidation or capital reduction of such companies may not be offset. 
Poland: 
Capital losses in fixed business assets are deductible from ordinary business income. 
United Kingdom 
There  are  no  extra  regulations  for  the  tax  treatment  of  capital  losses  from  investment  in 
shares. 
Recommendation 
Generally, venture capital companies favour the possibility to deduct the realised risks (capital 
losses) from their ordinary income (profit). But, according to the tax system, in some coun-
tries capital losses are not deductible – e.g. in Germany, where the equivalent capital gains are 
basically  tax-exempt.  For  venture  capital  purposes,  allowing  an  election  between  capital 
losses being treated as ordinary losses and accordingly capital gains being taxed, or capital 
losses and capital gains being irrelevant for tax purposes could be considered. Special atten-
tion has to been given to fit such an extra regulation into the national tax system. 
Capital gains 
Austria 
In general, gains derived from the sale or other disposition of business property are taxed as 
business income of a company at normal rates.  
France 
Capital gains are generally deemed to be ordinary income and are, therefore, taxed at the 
standard corporate tax rate (plus surcharges). However, a reduced rate (19% + 3% surcharge = 
19.57%) applies to gains on participation shares, i.e. shares qualifying for the participation Access to Finance and Venture  
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exemption. A participation exemption is available for parent companies regarding dividends 
received from their subsidiaries. These gains are referred to as long-term capital gains. When 
the reduced rate applies, the after-tax gain must be booked to a long-term capital gains re-
serve. Distribution of the reserve results in the imposition of corporate tax at the normal rate 
but a credit is given for tax already paid at a reduced rate. 
Germany 
Capital gains are generally included in taxable income. But capital gains from the sale of 
shares are, in principle, fully exempt from corporate income tax and business tax. However, a 
lump sum of 5% of the gains is then added to taxable income representing non-deductible 
business expenses. The exemption is not granted to the extent that the holding has previously 
been written down to its lower going-concern value and has not subsequently been revalued 
upwards.  
Poland 
There is no separate capital gains tax, but gains derived in a tax year are added to the tax-
payer’s total ordinary income. 
United Kingdom 
There are no extra regulations for the tax treatment of capital gains out of investment in 
shares. 
Recommendation 
Venture capital experts emphasise the importance of a reduced or zero-taxation of capital 
gains. Some tax systems include this feature, e.g. the German one. If the national tax system 
provides taxation of capital gains, it should accordingly provide tax deductibility for capital 
losses (e.g. Austria, Poland, the United Kingdom). A tax incentive for venture capital compa-
nies is common practice in France: Capital losses are generally treated as ordinary losses, but 
capital gains are subject to a reduced corporate tax rate. As the after-tax gain must be booked 
to a long-term capital gains reserve, distribution of which results in the imposition of corpo-
rate tax at the normal rate, a misuse seems generally avoided. As venture capital companies 
usually re-invest their capital gains, the French regulation could be made a European standard. 
Regulations as in Germany obstruct venture  capital companies’ activity, as 5% of capital 
gains have to be taxed at normal rates, but 0% of capital losses are deductible for tax pur-
poses. 
An additional regulation for venture capital companies might be the introduction of a general 
rollover relief. As the considered countries do not have special regulations for rollover relief 
in venture capital companies, no recommendations can be deducted. But the above-mentioned Access to Finance and Venture  
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French system of reduced taxation of capital gains combined with booking a capital gains 
reserve, equals the effect of a partial rollover relief for the capital gains. 
Last but not least it should be stated that naturally any possibility of reduced taxation, as men-
tioned for SMEs, can be transferred on venture capital companies. Therefore, the British re-
liefs known as the enterprise investment scheme (EIS) and the venture capital trust (VCT) as 
described above, may be steps in that direction. 
7  Considerations to Enhance the Access of SMEs to Financial Resources 
(1) The study has shown that the access to financial resources for SMEs in all countries se-
lected is still perceived as a problem. Two main reasons for that have been identified. First, 
the capital structure of SMEs in the selected countries (with a certain difference in the UK) 
shows a weak share of equity.  
The weakness of the equity share in continental European SMEs is a result of the four ef-
fects described in chapter 4.4. The effects are (A) the financing of retirements, (B) cultural 
aspects, (C) the national accounting standards to the equity share, and (D) the opportunity cost 
of capital.  
The differences among the accounting standards (C) only have a minor impact on the com-
parison of the true equity shares and prices in the various countries. That is different for the 
influence of retirement financing (A) and cultural effects (B). In particular, in bank system 
driven countries like Austria and Germany, the cultural effect leads to low acceptance of pri-
vate equity. SMEs in bank system driven countries are quite reluctant to allow private equity 
companies access to managerial decisions. This psychological aspect is an additional barrier 
for equity providers. Both effects promote, as shown in chapter 4.4., debt-financing in conti-
nental Europe and equity financing in the UK. 
Finally, the opportunity cost of capital (D) has a strong influence on financing decisions of 
SMEs. The following chart shows the impact of all effects on the difference between cost of 
equity and debt financing. Access to Finance and Venture  
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Source:   Own production 
As has been shown in chapter 5, the variety in tax systems between the UK and continental 
Europe leads to differences in debt-financing cost (D). The tax scheme in the UK little pro-
motes debt-financing compared to equity in contrast to continental European tax schemes. 
Detailed recommendations concerning the tax systems are given in paragraphs (2) to (8).  
For effect (A), the financing of retirements, economic circumstances will lead to a solution 
without political corrective: As the continental European retirement system, which is based on 
the pay as you go pension system, will not be able to finance retirement cost in reduced popu-
lations of the future, a more capital market oriented system will emerge. Pension funds as 
seen in the UK will get more relevance in the continental EU countries, leading more capital 
to the investment market. Politics should provide a sufficient legal framework for this devel-
opment. 
Effect (B), the cultural aspect, may be influenced by a EU and/or national promotion: Sug-
gesting to SMEs that allowing external equity investments in their business can lead to a 
change of perspective in family-owned companies. This effect will be enhanced by the change 
of generations in post-war companies to the younger, more open-minded “Erbengeneration”. 
Effect (C), differing national accounting standards, has started to decline with the introduc-
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should be accelerated by enforcing international standards for smaller and non-capital market 
oriented companies, too. The moment this development reaches SMEs, the negative aspects of 
taxation will decline. 
One additional aspect has to be mentioned: The low equity ratios for continental European 
countries (only partly for France) are still a burden for the economic growth of SMEs. To 
keep the financial system in Europe stable, all banks have to reduce the share of credits in 
their total portfolio. The banking crisis in Germany initiated by the collapse of the market in 
2001, shows that a large credit portfolio in a recession is a factor to destabilise the financial 
system.  
(2) The second main hindrance to SMEs’ access to financial resources, esp. to private equity, 
is the tax system (Da). As has been shown in our study, tax schemes in the selected countries 
show a certain variety. Most countries allow tax reductions only for debt financing of compa-
nies. Accordingly there is a tax discrimination of equity financing schemes. As an increase in 
companies’ debt-equity-ratio can be observed, most of the selected countries tighten their thin 
capitalisation rules. Only Austria treats equity financing differently to the other countries as 
discussed above. This privilege of debt financing, resulting in low debt to equity ratios, can be 
seen in the following figure. 











Source:   Own production 
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Increasing debt-equity-ratios for a company with very low rates results in decreasing cost of 
capital, as leverage and tax effects can be made use of. Simultaneously, the cost of capital 
increases, as increasing loans have to be guaranteed and creditors accept higher risk only on 
higher interest rates. At a certain point, the cost-increasing effect of rising risk exceed cost-
decreasing effects of leverage and tax, and total capital cost increase. 
(3) The tax recommendations have to be made separately for the different subjects to tax. In 
general three different kinds of subjects can be differentiated:  
1. Taxation of equity financed SMEs; 
2. Taxation of debt financed SMEs; 
3. Taxation of venture capital firms. 
(4) For the taxation of equity financed SMEs the following recommendation for corporate 
SMEs and partnerships/sole proprietorships should be considered. 
•  In general, the total tax burden should be decreased as much as possible. Not 
paying tax on small start-up profits enables newly created companies to build up 
urgently needed capital on their own. 
•  Accordingly,  tax  rates  should  be  reduced  for  corporations  with  small  profits 
and/or low turnovers, as given e.g. in the French and United Kingdom’s corporate 
income tax. By – additionally or alternatively – introducing an age limit, the fo-
cus can be set on young companies. The starting tax rate for SMEs should be 
half of the standard rate or lower, so that the tax difference to partnerships de-
creases. Alternatively, an electoral law could be introduced, giving the sharehold-
ers the possibility to be taxed like partners of a partnership for a fixed period of 
time. 
•  As has been shown, equity-financed corporations suffer higher taxes as they are 
not allowed to reduce their profits by a fictive interest rate as “return on eq-
uity”. So, from their point of view, debt-financing is regularly “tax-reducing” 
when compared to equity financing, so that corporations are misled to obtain as 
much of their capital as possible in the way of debt. This behaviour is avoided by 
allowing taxpayers in Austria to elect the deduction of fictitious interest for addi-
tional equity capital. A similar but more complicated regulation was applicable in 
Italy some years ago. Access to Finance and Venture  
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•  Loss carry-forward should be allowed indefinitely, as it is in the United King-
dom. Restrictions make a corporations future business difficult, because it may 
have to pay taxes on profits without being in the black overall. By the same to-
ken, minimum taxation (Austria, Germany, and Poland) should be abolished or 
at least restricted to large companies. 
•  Additionally, tax systems should include at least one or two years of loss carry-
back. Getting back taxes that have been paid in previous years when losses incur 
will function as additional liquidity and equity and will help companies get out of 
the red faster. 
•  Promising incentives for young entrepreneurs are given by British regulations: 
They are allowed to set off losses of the first four assessment years of trading 
against  income  of  the  three  assessment  years  preceding  trading.  Additionally, 
pre-trading expenditure incurred in the seven years before commencement of 
trading is deductible on the commencement of trading. 
•  When partnerships’ and sole proprietorships’ profits increase, progressive income 
tax rate increase, too. Above a certain profit per partner the tax is higher than the 
corporate income tax would be. To avoid this  effect and the ensuing  need to 
change the legal form of the organisation, an electoral law for taxation as a (fic-
tive) corporation could be introduced. So partnerships can get the tax incentives 
of profit accumulating corporations (lock-in effect) without carrying additional 
cost for the change of legal form (see e.g. France). 
•  If companies are given the possibility to contribute profits to a provision for fu-
ture investments, they are stimulated to re-invest the money they earned. Given 
at least for the first periods of new SMEs, this possibility will enable them to 
build up equity faster. 
 
(5) As has been mentioned, a positive tax effect for debt-financed companies is the deduction 
of interest paid. This imbalance should be avoided by allowing companies to deduct fictive 
interest on their equity. Any thin-capitalisation rules should be abolished or replaced by 
offshore-rules, not affecting company structures in EU Member States. If abolishment seems 
not possible, they should at least be supplemented by SME rules (like e.g. in Germany, but 
with higher amounts). 
(6) Taxation of venture capital companies may be revised for capital market purposes: Access to Finance and Venture  
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•  If the tax system does not disagree, extraordinary depreciation and the deduction 
of capital losses should be allowed for venture capital companies’ tax purposes. 
This applies at least to tax rules in countries that impute taxes on capital gains, 
e.g. Austria and Poland.  
•  Capital gains of venture capital companies should be treated under a special tax 
scheme with reduced rates, as it is imputed in the United Kingdom. Additionally, 
a rollover relief for those companies’ capital gains should be provided. 
 
(7) It should be clear from the facts presented above, that it is absolutely paramount to en-
hance the equity share of SMEs. The stability of the SME itself as well as the stability of the 
financial system will be enhanced by higher equity shares of SMEs. It therefore justifies a 
requirement for political decision makers to enhance the incentives for SMEs in order to in-
crease their equity financing. This can be provided by the tools discussed above. However, we 
see a particular urgency in the changes in the tax regulations. Here political decision makers 
can have a strong impact on the effectiveness of the tax system. Furthermore, changes in the 
tax system have a strong impact on short-term decisions made by SMEs. An adjustment of the 
tax system is therefore the most promising approach to realise a change in the financing of 
SMEs.  
(8) However, it should also be clear from the argumentabove, that even the UK does not pro-
vide any solution to early stage equity investments. Equity for early stage companies is not 
available through market mechanisms. We accordingly recommend thinking about state gov-
erned tools to enhance the availability of equity capital to early stage SMEs. Attempts as 
started  by  the  Austrian  Wirtschaftsservicegesellschaft  (AWS),  the  Kreditanstalt  für  Wied-
eraufbau (KfW) and the British DTI are sustainable blue prints for activities provided by other 
governmental organisations. We imagine that even on a European level the introduction of 
funds focusing on equity investments in early stage SMEs could make sense. Furthermore, the 
idea to combine technology funding with the access to equity capital seems to be promising. 
The obligation of a stronger focus on exploitability of project results by the European Com-
mission is quite successful. A similar obligation linked to the projects by requesting certain 
financial structures might be promising too. We however warn to believe in one perfect way 
of enhancing the access of early stage SMEs to financing. A mix of various European and 
national approaches is definitely most promising. 
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